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PATENT-INELIGIBILITY AS COUNTERACTION 
KEVIN EMERSON COLLINS 
ABSTRACT 
Today, normative debates over restrictions on patent-eligibility are 
uniformly premised on a discrimination theory of patent-ineligibility: the 
restrictions are assumed to cause the patent regime as a whole to 
discriminate against, and thus grant weaker patent protection for, the 
affected technology. Under discrimination theory, the justification for a rule 
of patent ineligibility turns on whether there is a good reason to treat the 
affected technology differently and grant it only relatively weak protection. 
In contrast, this Article articulates a novel counteraction theory of patent-
ineligibility. Counteraction theory adopts the default premise that all 
technologies merit roughly the same strength of patent protection, and it 
recognizes that, in some circumstances, a well-tailored restriction on 
patent-eligibility can be the most effective means of achieving that rough 
equality. The weakening of patent protection caused by restrictions on 
patent-eligibility can sometimes offset the unusually strong protection that 
is created by inherent, technology-specific biases in the patent doctrines 
other than patent-eligibility, including novelty, nonobviousness, and 
enablement. A restriction on the patent-eligibility of a technology can thus 
bring the strength of the patent protection available for the technology back 
closer to the norm of protection granted for all technologies. 
A full account of counteraction theory entails an explanation of when 
and how the inherent, technology-specific biases in favor of strong 
protection can arise in the patent doctrines other than patent-eligibility, 
such as novelty, nonobviousness, and enablement. This Article focuses on 
one such explanation: the dematerialization of technology in today’s 
knowledge-age economy has led to technology-specific regulatory 
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inefficacy in these doctrines. Certain non-eligibility patent doctrines cannot 
do the work of regulating patent validity that we expect them to be able to 
do when they are brought to bear on certain intangible technologies, 
meaning that they sanction unusually strong protection for those 
technologies. Technology-specific regulatory inefficacy sets the stage for a 
counteraction-oriented justification of restrictions on patent-eligibility. The 
restrictions can counteract or neutralize the unusually strong protection 
created by the inefficacy of the non-eligibility doctrines, bringing the 
strength of the patent protection that is available for the affected technology 
back into closer alignment with the protection that is available for other 
technologies.  
In addition to articulating counteraction theory and technology-specific 
regulatory inefficacy as theoretical possibilities, this Article examines the 
actual restrictions on patent-eligibility in two intangible technologies that 
are on the front lines of the ongoing battles over patent-eligible subject 
matter: diagnostic inferences and software. The Supreme Court has recently 
announced restrictions on the patent-eligibility of both technologies, and 
both restrictions are highly controversial under discrimination theory. 
However, the restrictions have a reasonable, although concededly 
imperfect, fit with the restrictions that can be justified under counteraction 
theory. In each technology, patent protection is unusually strong because 
certain non-eligibility doctrines fail to provide their expected validity-
limiting regulation, and the Court’s restriction on patent-eligibility works 
to counteract that strength. 
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INTRODUCTION 
From 2010 to 2014, the Supreme Court addressed the Section 101 
doctrine of patent-ineligibility in an unprecedented four cases. Confronted 
with patents on technologies ranging from business methods1 and software2 
to diagnostic inferences3 and human genetics,4 the Court invalidated the 
patents at issue in all four cases. Collectively, these opinions clearly signal 
the Court’s intent to curtail the reach of patent-eligible subject matter. 
A voluminous scholarly debate addresses the conditions under which 
restrictions on patent-eligibility like those announced by the Supreme Court 
have viable consequentialist justifications.5 To date, what this Article calls 
the discrimination theory of patent-ineligibility has structured this debate: 
the goal of a restriction on patent-eligibility is to make the patent regime as 
a whole discriminate against the affected technology and provide relatively 
weak protection for it.6 Discrimination theory focuses the normative debate 
 
 
 1. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).  
 2. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).  
 3. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).  
 4. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). 
 5. This Article focuses solely on consequentialist justifications. It does not address moral 
justifications. Cf. Tun-Jen Chiang, Competing Visions of Patentable Subject Matter, 82 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1858 (2014) (arguing that some disagreements over patent-eligibility reduce to different moral 
commitments). Nor does it address statutory interpretation. Cf. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A. 
1979) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s articulation of patent-ineligibility conflicts with the structure 
of the Patent Act). Statutory interpretation is relevant to the project, but only in an indirect way: the lack 
of an explicit textual grounding for the doctrine of patent-eligibility in the Patent Act increases the 
salience of consequentialist reasoning in patent-eligibility analyses.  
 6. See, e.g., Bernard Chao, Moderating Mayo, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 423 (2012); Tun-Jen Chiang, 
The Rules and Standards of Patentable Subject Matter, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 1353 (2010); John F. Duffy, 
Rules and Standards on the Forefront of Patentability, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 609 (2009); Rebecca 
S. Eisenberg, Wisdom of the Ages or Dead-Hand Control? Patentable Subject Matter for Diagnostic 
Methods After In re Bilski, 3 CASE W. RES. J.L. TECH. & INTERNET 1 (2012) [hereinafter Wisdom]; 
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Prometheus Rebound: Diagnostics, Nature, and Mathematical Algorithms, 122 
YALE L.J. ONLINE 341 (2013) [hereinafter Prometheus Rebound]; John M. Golden, Patentable Subject 
Matter and Institutional Choice, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1041 (2011); Anna B. Laakmann, An Explicit Policy 
Lever for Patent Scope, 19 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 43 (2012); Mark A. Lemley, Michael 
Risch, Ted Sichelman, & R. Polk Wagner, Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315 (2011); Peter S. 
Menell, Forty Years of Wondering in the Wilderness and No Closer to the Promised Land: Bilski's 
Superficial Textualism and the Missed Opportunity to Return Patent Law to Its Technology Mooring, 63 
STAN. L. REV. 1289 (2011); David S. Olson, Taking the Utilitarian Basis for Patent Law Seriously: The 
Case for Restricting Patentable Subject Matter, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 181, 195 (2009); Lisa Larrimore 
Ouellette, Patentable Subject Matter and Nonpatent Innovation Incentives, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1115 
(2015); Arti Rai, Biomedical Patents at the Supreme Court: A Path Forward, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 
111 (2013); Pamela Samuelson & Jason Schultz, “Clues” for Determining Whether Business and Service 
Innovations Are Unpatentable Abstract Ideas, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 109 (2011); Jacob S. 
Sherkow, The Natural Complexity of Patent Eligibility, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1137 (2014); Katherine J. 
Strandburg, Much Ado About Preemption, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 563 (2012) [hereinafter Preemption]; 
Katherine J. Strandburg, An Institutional Approach to Patentable Subject Matter (unpublished 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss4/8
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on whether the affected technology merits a smaller quantum of protection 
than other technologies merit. Is the technology unusually likely to be a 
basic tool, meaning that patent protection would significantly retard future 
innovation? Is there less of a need for incentives to discover, commercialize, 
and disclose the technology, meaning that significant innovation and 
disclosure would persist absent patent protection? Although one focuses on 
the possibility of patent protection having large costs and the other on the 
possibility of patent protection having small benefits, both of these 
questions seek to justify restrictions on patent-eligibility by demonstrating 
that the net impact of ordinary, full-strength patents would be detrimental 
to overall social welfare and that weaker patents are therefore preferable.  
This Article proposes and explores a different theory of the role that a 
restriction on patent-eligibility can play to shape optimal patent protection.7 
Patent-ineligibility is not the only doctrine that can implement a 
“substantive screen” regulating the outer limits of what constitutes a 
permissible patent interest (i.e., that reduces overall patent strength by 
selectively invalidating the most socially costly patents).8 In fact, patent 
law’s “patentability conditions”—that is, its validity doctrines other than 
patent-eligibility, including novelty, inherency, nonobviousness, 
overbreadth, and the rules of means-plus-function claiming—do the bulk of 
this regulatory work. One key, unrecognized fact about the patentability 
conditions is that they are sometimes unable to do the regulatory work that 
we expect them to do when they are brought to bear on certain technologies, 
leading to an inherent bias in favor of strong, socially costly patent 
protection in those technologies.9 The counteraction theory of patent-
ineligibility proposes that restrictions on patent-eligibility are sometimes 
the most effective means of offsetting such technology-specific biases in the 
patentability conditions and helping to equalize the strength of patent 
protection for all technologies.10 
 
 
manuscript) (on file with author) [hereinafter Institutional Approach]. A significant thread in the 
discrimination-theory debate addresses a second-order question about doctrinal means: When 
discrimination is merited, are the patentability conditions or restrictions on patent-eligibility the better 
tools for achieving that discrimination? See infra note 276 and accompanying text. 
 7. The argument here is not that discrimination theory is conceptually unsound. The goal is only 
to add another justification to the list of viable justifications for restrictions on patent-eligibility. 
 8. Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Screens and Patent Examination, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 687 (2010) 
(distinguishing substantive and costly screens). 
 9. This observation undermines what is perhaps the most commonly deployed argument against 
restrictions on patent-eligibility, namely, that anything that patent-eligibility can do to regulate patent 
validity, the patentability conditions can do better. See infra note 276 and accompanying text (discussing 
this “Annie Oakley” argument against restrictions on patent-eligibility). The dominance of this argument 
has likely contributed to the inherent biases in the patentability conditions going unnoticed for so long. 
 10. The goal of roughly equal patent protection for all technologies is, of course, only a default. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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A focus on counteraction theory tees up questions about the condition 
precedent that creates the need for counteraction. Why are there technology-
specific biases in the patentability conditions? That is, why are certain 
patentability conditions in certain technologies unable to do the work of 
invalidating costly patents that we expect them to do? Although there may 
be more than one answer to these questions, the answer on which this Article 
focuses is a doctrinal phenomenon that this Article terms technology-
specific regulatory inefficacy.11 A simple metaphor is helpful here to 
introduce the concept. The patentability conditions are legal tools for 
regulating patent validity. The physical tools in our basement toolboxes are 
only able to do the work that we expect them to be able to do when the 
technologies on which they are brought to bear have certain properties. For 
example, a crescent wrench can only do its work of tightening or loosening 
something when the something on which it is brought to bear is shaped like 
a nut. The central insight behind technology-specific regulatory inefficacy 
is that many of the patentability conditions are like conventional tools in 
that they, too, can only do their regulatory work when the claimed 
technologies have certain fundamental properties. They can only latch onto 
the claimed technologies and achieve the leverage required to regulate 
patent validity when the claimed technologies have certain fundamental 
properties. When technologies lack these fundamental properties, the 
patentability conditions are ineffective regulators, making the validity 
regulation for patents on those technologies lax and the resulting protection 
unusually strong. This is technology-specific regulatory inefficacy in a 
nutshell, and its action (making patents stronger on an arbitrary basis) is one 
reason why counteraction with a restriction on patent-eligibility (reducing 
patent strength) sometimes makes sense. When certain patentability 
conditions cannot regulate what constitutes a permissible patent interest or 
invalidate costly patents when they are brought to bear on certain 
technologies, patent-eligibility can step into the regulatory gap and do the 
needed work.  
Technology-specific regulatory inefficacy rests on an argument about 
technological specificity in patent law, but it is a very different type of 
argument than the argument that is conventionally made about 
 
 
Conventional arguments about technological specificity in patent law suggest that different industries 
may have different innovation profiles that are best incentivized with different types of patent protection. 
See infra notes 281–282 and accompanying text. However, absent any reason for protecting different 
technologies with patents of different strengths, the default position should remain equal treatment for 
all technologies. 
 11. See infra note 80 (discussing other sources of biases in the patentability conditions that may 
give rise to a need for counteraction with a restriction on patent-eligibility). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss4/8
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technological specificity in patent law. The conventional argument posits 
that patent law is neutral on its face, both textually and in action in the 
courts, and that technology specificity arises only when judges use patent 
law in different ways in response to the different innovation profiles of 
different industries, whether consciously or not.12 In contrast, technology-
specific regulatory inefficacy posits that technological specificity is baked 
into the patentability conditions.13 The belief that patent doctrine is 
technologically neutral absent judicial inflection is mistaken, but it is also 
understandable. The regulatory efficacy of the patentability conditions is 
contingent on properties of a technology that are so fundamental that, at first 
glance, it may seem like all technologies possess them. In fact, when the 
modern patentability conditions evolved in the industrial era of the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, all patentable technologies did 
possess them. Over the course of the last half-century, however, the intrinsic 
nature of socially valuable technology underwent a radical change: it 
dematerialized.14 In today’s knowledge-age economy, information-
processing technology with only a light footprint in the material world of 
extension is now commonplace. Intangibility lies at the root of the 
regulatory inefficacy identified in this Article: dematerialization altered the 
fundamental properties of technology on which the patentability conditions 
depend to achieve regulatory leverage. A rigorous examination of both the 
intrinsic nature of contemporary, dematerialized technology and the 
mechanisms through which the patentability conditions operate is required 
to reveal the technological specificity that is hard-wired into contemporary 
patent law.  
As proof of concept of both the counteraction theory of patent-
ineligibility and the technology-specific regulatory inefficacy that creates 
the need for counteraction, this Article focuses on two dematerialized 
technologies that are on the front lines of the contemporary battles over 
patent-ineligibility: diagnostic inferences, the technology at issue in the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus 
Laboratories,15 and software, the technology at issue in the Court’s opinion 
in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International.16 The intangibility of each 
 
 
 12. DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE 
IT (2009); John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & David L. Schwartz, Our Divided Patent System, 82 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1073, 1078 (2015). 
 13. Judges would need to actively craft any technology-specific restrictions on patent-eligibility 
adopted to counteract the baked-in technological specificity of regulatory inefficacy. 
 14. See infra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 15. 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).  
 16. 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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technology undermines the validity regulation normally imposed by certain 
patentability conditions. In turn, each technology is a good candidate for a 
restriction on patent-eligibility under counteraction theory to normalize the 
net strength of the validity regulation imposed.  
Diagnostic inferences are highly unusual technologies. A diagnostic 
inference is an act of mental cognition in which a doctor logically reasons 
from two factual premises to reach a conclusion about a patient’s health.17 
More specifically, the premises are, first, a general correlation—say, in 
general, patients with fevers are likely ill—and, second, a bit of knowledge 
about a particular patient—say, Sally has a fever. Based on these two 
premises, the doctor can reason to a diagnostic conclusion—namely, Sally 
is likely ill. Diagnostic inferences are unusual because, while most 
technologies exist in the extra-mental world, diagnostic inferences are built 
out of meaningful mental states within a thinker’s mind. When patented 
technologies are built from meaningful mental states rather than extra-
mental entities, neither inherency nor overbreadth, two of patent law’s most 
important patentability conditions, can do the cost-reducing, regulatory 
work that we routinely expect them to do.  
Inherency normally regulates patent validity and reduces costly patent 
density by enforcing the categorical rule that discovering new knowledge 
about how a product or process works, without also generating a new 
product or process that embodies the knowledge in a way that puts it to 
work, does not amount to a patentable invention. This rule may initially 
seem like it can be used in all technologies. However, upon closer 
inspection, it becomes clear that it only works under certain conditions. 
Inherency can only do its cost-reducing, regulatory work when there is a 
clear distinction between a product or process that puts knowledge to work 
in a useful manner, on the one hand, and the knowledge itself, on the other 
hand. This distinction is self-evident when the patented products and 
processes exist in the extra-mental world. Such products and processes are 
clearly different from knowledge in thinkers’ minds. However, the 
distinction collapses when patents claim the use of meaningful mental states 
in human minds, as diagnostic-inference patents do, because both the both 
the products/processes and the knowledge are constructed from meaningful 
mental states. Under these circumstances, inherency loses its regulatory 
efficacy and is unable to reduce costly patent density.18  
Overbreadth, too, normally does important cost-reducing work as a 
 
 
 17. See infra Section II.A.  
 18. See infra Section II.B.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss4/8
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regulator of patent validity: it invalidates highly general, and thus costly, 
patent claims. Judges and examiners detect overbreadth by querying 
whether the set of claimed technologies is disproportionately large with 
respect to the set of technologies that an inventor invents and discloses in 
the patent specification. Thus, overbreadth only works as a regulator of 
patent validity when generality is a set-theoretical construct. That is, it only 
works when greater generality is caused by a larger number of distinct 
technologies being grouped together in a single collection. However, the 
generality of a meaningful mental state in a thinker’s mind is not a set-
theoretical construct. A mental state that embodies highly general 
knowledge is a singular mental state that is intrinsically general, not a large 
collection of distinct mental states. When inventors seek patents on 
diagnostic inferences, they can therefore draft claims that are highly general 
yet that are “picture claims” encompassing only a single embodiment. So 
long as the claimed embodiment is disclosed, picture claims are never 
overbroad, meaning that inventors can easily obtain a general claim by 
inventing and disclosing a single embodiment of a diagnostic inference that 
is intrinsically general. The ability to enable and demonstrate possession of 
a general claim through disclosure of a single embodiment makes 
overbreadth an ineffective regulator of patent validity, even when it is 
brought to bear on the most general, and thus the most costly, of diagnostic-
inference claims.19 
Software is also an unusual technology, although in an entirely different 
way. It is a purely functional technology in the sense that it has been 
engineered so that a programmer need not know what is happening on a 
structural, material level within a computer in order to conceive a program 
or reduce it to practice.20 In other words, software is aspatial: its 
arrangement in space is irrelevant to the definition of what constitutes an 
invention. Several patentability conditions, including the written description 
and the rules of means-plus-function claiming, depend on some aspects of 
the physical structure of a technology being relevant to the definition of a 
patentable invention in order to do their cost-reducing work of curtailing 
permissible patent generality. These patentability conditions simply cannot 
work like they usually do when they are brought to bear on purely functional 
technologies like software, meaning that they suffer from technology-
specific regulatory inefficacy.21  
 
 
 19. See infra Section II.C.  
 20. See infra Section III.A.  
 21. See infra Section III.B. The Federal Circuit’s adoption of algorithms as the metaphorical 
structures of software inventions mitigates this regulatory inefficacy, but it falls far short of eliminating 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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As demonstrated in these three examples, certain of the patentability 
conditions cannot do the cost-reducing work that we expect them to do when 
patents claim diagnostic inferences and software. The patentability 
conditions impose lax validity regulation in these technologies and create 
unintended biases in favor of strong patent protection. Counteraction theory 
suggests that restrictions on patent-eligibility can offset the biases and bring 
the patent protection for these technologies into closer alignment with the 
patent protection that is available for other technologies. 
Of course, a counteracting restriction on patent-eligibility should ideally 
be tailored to the regulatory inefficacy at issue in a particular 
technology/patentability-condition pairing.22 To test the explanatory power 
of counteraction theory in contemporary patent law, this Article maps the 
restrictions on the patent-eligibility of diagnostic inferences and software 
that can be justified under counteraction theory onto the restrictions that the 
Supreme Court announced in its Mayo and Alice opinions, respectively.23 In 
some respects, the fit between counteraction theory and the Court’s 
restrictions on patent-eligibility is remarkably good. Counteraction theory 
does a better job of justifying the Mayo opinion and its oft-criticized 
inventive-concept approach to the patent-ineligibility than discrimination 
theory does, at least under a mind-centered, rather than nature-centered, 
interpretation of Mayo.24 It also provides a reasonable justification for Alice, 
although discrimination theory does, too, and the superiority of the 
inventive-concept approach is not as clear cut.25 
 
 
it. See infra notes 251–255 and accompanying text. 
 22. Counteraction theory works best when restrictions on patent-eligibility are closer to thinning 
provisions, like the restrictions announced in the Supreme Court’s recent cases, than categorical 
exclusions of entire innovative endeavors. See infra notes 71–72 and accompanying text. If the 
restrictions were broad categorical exclusions, then patent-ineligibility would be more likely to 
overcompensate for whatever pro-patentee, technology-specific biases inhere in the patentability 
conditions.  
 23. The step from an identified instance of technology-specific regulatory inefficacy to a free-
standing justification for all of the details of a specific restriction on patent-eligibility is admittedly a big 
one. See infra notes 75–79. A more modest, yet still important, deliverable lies in recognizing that 
technology-specific regulatory inefficacy allows some applicants to prosecute downhill and requires the 
patent examiners who are protecting the public interest to examine uphill. Even if the playing field is 
not returned to a perfectly level position, restrictions on patent-eligibility are more justifiable in 
technologies where there is a pre-existing slope to counteract than in technologies where the field starts 
out level.  
 24. See infra Section II.D.  
 25. See infra Section III.C. Counteraction theory cannot conveniently justify all of the Supreme 
Court’s recent cases on patent-eligibility. For example, it cannot defend Association for Molecular 
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, the Court’s recent patent-ineligibility opinion addressing the products of 
nature exclusion. 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (holding that genomic DNA, but not complementary DNA, is 
patent-ineligible); Dan L. Burk, The Curious Incident of the Supreme Court in Myriad Genetics, 90 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 505 (2014). More broadly, counteraction theory cannot justify any restriction on 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss4/8
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Together, the concepts of counteraction and technology-specific 
regulatory inefficacy push patent law scholarship in new directions on 
several dimensions. They turn the role that the patentability conditions have 
to date played in arguments over patent-ineligibility on its head,26 they 
counsel against a one-size-fits-all doctrine of patent-ineligibility,27 and they 
add a focus on the intrinsic nature of technology to the ongoing discussion 
about technological specificity in patent law.28 Finally, they offer an 
otherwise absent explanation of why and how intangibility should continue 
to limit patent-eligible subject matter, even in today’s knowledge 
economy.29 
This Article proceeds in four substantive parts. Part I introduces 
counteraction theory and technology-specific regulatory inefficacy. The 
following two parts offer proof of concept, with Part II focusing on 
diagnostic inferences and Part III addressing software. Part IV briefly notes 
how counteraction theory takes patent scholarship in new directions. 
I. THEORY: COUNTERACTION TO REGULATORY INEFFICACY 
Counteraction theory provides an original, consequentialist justification 
for restrictions on patent-eligibility. Section I.A explains how the 
patentability conditions selectively screen costly claims out of the patent 
regime. Section I.B summarizes the Supreme Court’s recent patent-
ineligibility opinions and the conventional arguments structured by 
discrimination theory that animate the debate over whether these opinions 
have viable consequentialist justifications. Section I.C then introduces the 
two concepts that lie at the heart of this Article: counteraction theory and 
technology-specific regulatory inefficacy.  
  
 
 
patent-eligibility tasked with ensuring that the realm of the natural remains beyond the reach of patent 
law, including the restriction that results from a nature-centered reading of Mayo. See infra note 275 and 
accompanying text. 
 26. See infra Section IV.A. 
 27. See infra Section IV.B. 
 28. See infra Section IV.C. 
 29. See infra Section IV.D. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
966 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 94:955 
 
 
 
 
A. The Patentability Conditions 
Patent law’s principal goal is to speed up technological innovation.30 The 
basic story is a familiar, simple one: absent patent rights, rational 
individuals will not incur the sunk costs of innovation because they will not 
expect to recoup them in a competitive market for the innovation that they 
produce.31 Patent rights mitigate this problem. Patent law grants innovators 
temporally limited, exclusive rights to their innovations, creating an 
expectation that successful innovators can internalize some fraction of the 
social welfare that their innovations generate and, hopefully, recoup their 
sunk costs.32  
Yet, if the goal is to promote technological progress, patent law clearly 
cannot allow an inventor to claim anything that he holds out as an invention. 
Too much patent protection can be just as harmful as too little.33 Patent law 
therefore employs a set of validity doctrines that regulate what constitutes a 
permissible patent interest. Rather than randomly invalidating some fixed 
fraction of patent claims, these doctrines function as a substantive screen. 
They selectively invalidate only the most costly of tranches of patents.34 
These validity doctrines are commonly sorted into two categories: the 
patentability conditions, addressed below, and patent-ineligibility, 
addressed in the following section. 
The patentability conditions are grounded in different passages in the 
Patent Act, and they have little in common (except for their ability to 
invalidate costly patents, of course). With allowances for simplification, 
they fall into three groups based on the kind of work that they do. An initial 
group of patentability conditions, including novelty and nonobviousness, 
invalidates patents on technologies that are too close to the prior art.35 These 
patentability conditions further two distinct policy goals. First, they 
 
 
 30. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. Patent law promotes other goals, as well. It incentivizes the 
disclosure of inventions that might otherwise be kept secret. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 
470, 480–81 (1974). It may facilitate the coordinated development of innovative products, reducing the 
wasteful duplication of effort that inheres in competitive development. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature 
and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977).  
 31. See, e.g., STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF S. COMM. 
ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 1, 21 (Comm. Print 
1958) (prepared by Fritz Matchlup). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., 548 U.S. 124, 124–26 (2006) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting from dismissal of the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted). 
 34. Masur, supra note 8, at 716 (noting that substantive examination can “defang” costly patents).  
 35. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) (novelty); id. § 103 (nonobviousness). The “prior art” is a term of art 
for the technological status quo at the time of the application. It is the baseline used to determine whether 
a claim describes the kind of progress that merits patent protection. 
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invalidate costly patents on the low-hanging fruit of technological progress. 
If the claimed technology was already available to the public (not novel), or 
would have been made available to society in a timely manner even absent 
patent protection (obvious), patents provide little incentive benefit but still 
impose significant costs.36 Second, by denying patent protection to minor 
(or non-existent) advances, they reduce costly patent density.37 Another 
group of patentability conditions denies patent protection when inventors 
seek patent protection too early in a multi-step innovation process. Utility 
deems claims to many research intermediates to be useless,38 and 
enablement and written description invalidate claims to early-stage 
innovations due to lack of sufficient support in the disclosure.39 Here, the 
excluded claims are costly because they would, if valid, issue before much 
of the hard work needed to produce a downstream technology that has value 
to an end-user has been done, reducing the patent incentives available for 
that downstream work.40 The final group of patentability conditions 
removes costly claims from the patent regime by capping the permissible 
claim generality.41 These final doctrines operate through two related 
mechanisms. First, the overbreadth doctrines, also enforced through 
enablement and written description, tether permissible claim scope to the 
contribution to progress that an inventor publicly discloses in her patent 
specification.42 Second, the rules of means-plus-function claiming focus on 
the problematic nature of functional claims in particular, requiring claims 
drafted with purely functional language to be limited in scope to the 
structures for performing the function disclosed in the specification, as well 
as those structures’ equivalents.43  
B. Patent-Eligibility and Discrimination Theory  
The text of Section 101 of the Patent Act stating that only a “process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter” can be patented is the 
 
 
 36. Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of Patentability, 120 YALE 
L.J. 1590 (2011). 
 37. See infra notes 114–123 and accompanying text.  
 38. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012); Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 532–36 (1966); In re Glass, 492 
F.2d 1228, 1232–33 (1974).  
 39. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012); Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. 
Cir. 2010) (en banc).  
 40. Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289 (2003).  
 41. See infra notes 149–152 and accompanying text.  
 42. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012). 
 43. Id. § 112(f).  
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statutory basis for patent-eligibility.44 But contemporary debates over 
patent-ineligibility rarely parse the plain meanings of those terms.45 They 
focus instead on a set of judicial exclusions from patent-eligibility that are 
not expressly codified in the statute: laws of nature, products of nature, and 
abstract ideas are not eligible for patent protection, even if a patent applicant 
is the first to discover or invent them.46  
The importance of these judicial restrictions on patent-eligibility has 
risen and fallen in wave-like fashion over the last half century. The Supreme 
Court’s first batch of cases in the 1970s and early 1980s sent mixed 
messages,47 but they could easily be interpreted so as to give the restrictions 
some teeth. However, during the nearly thirty years of Supreme Court 
silence on patent-eligibility that ensued,48 the lower courts gradually 
rendered these restrictions toothless. Patent-eligible subject matter became 
an always-present formality.49 Most recently, in four opinions spanning only 
five years, the Court invalidated claims for lack of patent-eligibility, sending 
a strong signal that the doctrine should be reinvigorated so that it has 
significant bite.50 In Bilski v. Kappos,51 the Court held that a claim to a 
method of hedging financial risk is a patent-ineligible abstract idea.52 In 
Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories,53 it labeled a 
method of medical diagnosis as a patent-ineligible law of nature.54 In 
Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics,55 the Court held 
that genomic DNA isolated from the surrounding genome is a patent-
 
 
 44. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).  
 45. But see In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that a signal claim did not 
describe a “manufacture”). 
 46. The Supreme Court’s precise labels for these categories have varied over time. Alice Corp. v. 
CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 
S. Ct. 2107 (2013); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012); Bilski 
v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 
U.S. 303 (1980); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).  
 47. See infra note 62.  
 48. But see J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001) (holding 
that the Plant Patent Act did not implicitly remove sexually reproducing plants from the subject matter 
of the utility patent regime).  
 49. The decline of restrictions on patent-eligibility culminated in the useful, concrete, and tangible 
results test of State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 
1998). 
 50. The Court’s interest in patent-ineligibility was first signaled in its grant of certiorari in Lab. 
Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., 548 U.S. 124 (2006) (dismissing certiorari as improvidently 
granted). 
 51. 561 U.S. 593 (2010). 
 52. Id. 
 53. 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). 
 54. Id. 
 55. 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). 
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ineligible product of nature.56 Most recently, in Alice v. CLS Bank,57 it 
extended Bilski to hold that a claim to a method of reducing the financial 
risk of a transaction remains a patent-ineligible abstract idea even if it is 
limited in scope to computer execution.58  
These cases articulate a two-stage methodology for determining whether 
a claim recites patent-ineligible subject matter.59 First, examiners and judges 
must locate any patent-ineligible subject matter—that is, laws of nature, 
products of nature, and abstract ideas—to which the claim is directed. 
Second, they must determine whether the claim describes this patent-
ineligible subject matter in an impermissibly abstract manner or, 
alternatively, whether the claim contains limitations60 that describe a patent-
eligible application of the patent-ineligible subject matter. The proper way 
to perform each of these steps is contested, but the instructions for 
undertaking the second step—that is, distinguishing patent-ineligible claims 
to laws of nature and the like from claims to patent-eligible applications 
thereof—has proven to be extremely controversial.61 Surprising many in the 
patent community, the Court’s Mayo and Alice opinions revived the 
controversial inventive-concept approach to the methodology’s second 
stage.62 This approach incorporates a comparison to the prior art into the 
patent-eligibility analysis that resembles the comparison required by the 
novelty and nonobviousness doctrines. The limitations describing patent-
ineligible subject matter cannot be the only limitations that differentiate a 
claim from the prior art. Inversely stated, a claim is patent-eligible only if it 
has an inventive concept that is separate from any patent-ineligible subject 
 
 
 56. Id. 
 57. 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
 58. Id. 
 59. The PTO has provided a crisp distillation of this two-stage methodology. 2014 Interim 
Guidance on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility, 79 Fed. Reg. 74,618, 74,621 (Dec. 16, 2014) [hereinafter 
PTO Eligibility Guidelines].  
 60. Contemporary patent law employs claims, or descriptive texts, to delineate an inventor’s patent 
interest. Each phrase or clause in the descriptive text is called a “limitation” because it limits claim 
scope.  
 61. The controversy dates back to the difficult-to-reconcile reasoning employed in two Supreme 
Court opinions from the late 1970s and early 1980s. Compare Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188–89 
(1981) (rejecting any consideration of the novelty of certain features of the claimed invention in patent-
eligibility) with Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 591–95 (1978) (employing an inventive-concept 
approach in patent-eligibility). Before Mayo, the Federal Circuit had resolved this conflict by presuming 
that Diehr had implicitly overruled Flook. Arrhythmia Research Tech. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 
1053, 1057 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Mayo, the first of the Court’s recent cases to adopt the inventive-concept 
approach, elevates Flook over Diehr and papers over the conflict by simply ignoring the contrary 
language in Diehr. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1299.  
 62. See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357–60; Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1297–302; PTO Eligibility Guidelines, 
supra note 59, at 74,624.  
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matter implicated in the claim. If someone discovers a previously unknown 
law or product of nature, or if someone develops a new abstract idea, this 
contribution to progress, standing alone, is not the type of contribution that 
amounts to a patent-eligible invention under the inventive-concept 
approach. Claiming the patent-ineligible subject matter in combination with 
prior-art, patent-eligible technology does not magically yield patent-eligible 
subject matter. To create a patent-eligible invention, an inventor must 
demonstrate inventiveness—again, something akin to novelty and 
nonobviousness—in the way in which the law of nature, product of nature, 
or abstract idea is put to practical use, or applied to solve a problem, in the 
claim. 
The Supreme Court’s re-establishment of patent-ineligibility as a robust 
limit on what can be patented has prompted a voluminous debate over the 
doctrine’s consequentialist justifications.63 While this debate 
unquestionably contains diversity of opinions, its arguments 
overwhelmingly employ a discrimination theory of patent-ineligibility: they 
support (or undermine) restrictions on patent-eligibility by producing 
evidence that the patent regime should (or should not) discriminate against 
the affected technology and provide weak protection for it. Discrimination 
theory focuses the debate on a single question: Does the affected technology 
merit patent protection that is weaker than the norm of the protection given 
to other technologies?64  
Proponents of restrictions on patent-eligibility usually defend an 
affirmative answer to this question in two different ways. First, they adopt 
the Supreme Court’s statements that patent-ineligibility prevents the 
patenting of “the basic tools of scientific and technological work”65 or 
“building-block” technologies.66 Basic-tool patents would privatize the 
inputs into future innovation, doing more harm (by retarding future 
innovation) than good (by speeding up the development of the basic tools).67 
Second, proponents of restrictions on patent-eligible subject matter also 
argue that patent-ineligibility may be focused on technologies for which 
 
 
 63. See supra note 6.  
 64. In addition, some commentators debate a second-order question about doctrinal means: When 
discrimination is merited, are the patentability conditions or restrictions on patent-eligibility the better 
tools for achieving the discrimination? See infra note 276 and accompanying text.  
 65. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). 
 66. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1303 (2012).  
 67. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Are Business Method Patents Bad for Business?, 16 SANTA 
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 263, 276 (2000); Golden, supra note 6, at 1065–74; Lemley et 
al., supra note 6, at 1328–29. But see Strandburg, Preemption, supra note 6, at 568, 586–614 (arguing 
that patent-ineligibility has not historically targeted basic-tool claims that are likely to cause downstream 
preemption).  
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patent law’s innovation incentives are not needed.68 Both of these arguments 
sound in discrimination theory. The first focuses on the possibility of 
protection having large gross costs and the second on the possibility of it 
having small gross benefits, but both raise questions about whether the 
affected technology merits patent protection that is weaker than the norm 
given to other technologies.  
Discrimination theory often layers an efficient-gatekeeper argument on 
top of discrimination theory to support restrictions on patent-eligibility. A 
restriction may be an overbroad proxy for a set of costly patents, but the 
costs of its overbreadth may be outweighed by benefits of its 
administrability.69 The gatekeeper variant of discrimination theory carried a 
lot of weight in earlier eras when the restrictions on patent-eligibility being 
debated were categorical exclusions of entire fields of endeavor, such as 
barring business methods or software from the patent regime in their 
entirety.70 However, the import of the gatekeeper variant of discrimination 
theory is somewhat diminished today. The two-stage methodology in the 
Supreme Court’s recent patent-ineligibility cases creates restrictions that are 
best conceived as closer to the thinning provision end of the spectrum rather 
than the categorical exclusion end.71 They reduce the quantity of innovative 
 
 
 68. The lack of a need for patent incentives may be due to innovation being inexpensive to produce. 
Samuelson & Schultz, supra note 6, at 124–25. But see Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., 
548 U.S. 124, 126 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the cost of generating technologies is not 
relevant to patent-eligibility). Or, it may be due to non-patent institutions and business practices 
providing significant incentives. Dreyfuss, supra note 67, at 275; Ouellette, supra note 6, at 1129–31; 
Samuelson & Schultz, supra note 6, at 121–24; Strandburg, Institutional Approach, supra note 6; 
Katherine J. Strandburg, Users as Innovators: Implications for Patent Doctrine, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 
467, 492–94 (2008). For broader discussion of how sufficient innovation and creativity may exist absent 
intellectual-property incentives, see KAL RAUSTIALA & CHRISTOPHER SPRIGMAN, THE KNOCKOFF 
ECONOMY: HOW IMITATION SPARKS INNOVATION (2012); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Does IP Need IP? 
Accommodating Intellectual Production Outside the Intellectual Property Paradigm, 31 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1437 (2010); Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents-Prizes Debate, 92 
TEX. L. REV. 303 (2013). 
 69. See, e.g., Chiang, supra note 6, at 1360–63; Eisenberg, Wisdom, supra note 6, at 43–47; 
Golden, supra note 6, at 1055–74; Lemley et al., supra note 6, at 1326–27; Olson, supra note 6, at 184. 
Cf. Menell, supra note 6, at 1312 (advocating for a technological arts test); John R. Thomas, The 
Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1139 (1999) (same). See generally FREDERICK 
SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-
MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1991) (articulating an economic defense of rules, despite their over- and 
under-inclusiveness). One strain of the efficient-gatekeeper argument is built not on discrimination 
theory but on a broad conception of counteraction theory. See infra note 80. 
 70. Duffy, supra note 6, at 613; Eisenberg, Wisdom, supra note 6, at 45. Historical restrictions on 
patent-eligibility have taken the form of both rule-like categorical exclusions and standard-like thinning 
provisions. Chiang, supra note 6, at 1360–63; Duffy, supra note 6, at 623–38; Strandburg, Preemption, 
supra note 6, at 569–86. 
 71. Gatekeeper theory is also less important because the Court’s two-stage methodology is difficult 
to classify as very rule-like or inexpensive to administer. Eisenberg, Wisdom, supra note 6, at 46–47; 
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business methods, medical diagnostics, and software that can be patented 
without preventing them from being patented altogether.72  
C. Counteraction Theory and Regulatory Inefficacy 
The contemporary debate over the existence of a consequentialist 
justification for the Supreme Court’s recent patent-ineligibility cases has 
overlooked one reason why restrictions on patent-eligibility can help to craft 
optimal patent protection. If there are unplanned biases toward expansive 
protection for particular technologies that inhere in the patentability 
conditions, patent-ineligibility holds that patent-ineligibility can offset 
those biases. This is the core tenet of counteraction theory. Given restriction 
on patent-eligibility can bring the patent protection that is available for a 
technology into closer alignment with the protection that is available for 
other technologies and promote the default goal of sanctioning a roughly 
equal, although not exactly identical, quantum of patent protection for all 
technologies at the end of the day.73  
To be clear, counteraction theory recognizes that a restriction on patent-
eligibility itself, examined in isolation, does weaken the patent protection 
that is available for the affected technology. The point of disagreement is 
only whether the sum of the regulation imposed by all of the validity 
doctrines is necessarily stricter in a technology subject to a restriction on 
patent-eligibility than in a technology not subject to such a restriction. 
Counteraction theory recognizes that there is technology-specific laxity in 
some of the patentability conditions and that a well-crafted restriction on 
patent-eligibility can mitigate that laxity with a technology-specific curb on 
 
 
Michael Risch, Forward to the Past, 2009-2010 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 333, 362–63 (2010). But see 
Samuelson & Schultz, supra note 6, at 129–30 (arguing that Bilski provides “clues” that create a 
predictable framework for patent-ineligibility). A restriction on patent-eligibility could be relatively 
rule-like when compared to novelty and nonobviousness if it did not require a prior art search. Michael 
J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anti-Competitive Intellectual Property Litigation, 44 B.C. L. 
REV. 509, 541–43 (2003). However, given that the Supreme Court has adopted the inventive-concept 
approach for identifying patent-ineligible claims, see supra note 62 and accompanying text, a prior art 
search of some kind seems to be required. 
 72. Depending on how future cases are decided, medical diagnostics may prove to be the exception 
to this rule. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Diagnostics Need Not Apply, 21 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 256 (2015).  
 73. Technological neutrality is only a default. Under the conventional defense of technology-
specific patent law, a shift away from the default makes sense when the innovation profile in a particular 
industry counsels for stronger or weaker protection. See infra notes 281–282 and accompanying text. If 
an unplanned bias were to coincidentally grant stronger protection to an industry meriting strong 
protection, counteracting the bias could be counterproductive. See infra note 75 and accompanying text. 
However, absent a reason for protecting different technologies with patents of different strengths, the 
default position should be equal treatment for all technologies. Economically random departures from 
technological neutrality are difficult to defend. 
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patent-eligibility. Restrictions on patent-eligibility can trim back the 
unusually expansive nature of the patent protection sanctioned by the 
patentability conditions doctrines in certain technologies, furthering 
comparable validity regulation in all technologies.74 
Even assuming that there is technology-specific laxity in a patentability 
condition, there are several caveats on counteraction theory as a 
consequentialist justification for restrictions on patent-eligibility. The 
presumption that different technologies merit the same strength of patent 
protection is only a default, and it can be rebutted. The economic profile of 
a particular industry might call for strong patent protection,75 and this 
unusual strength could be achieved through embracing, rather than 
offsetting, any coincidental, lax validity regulation by the patentability 
conditions.76 Alternatively, even if strong patent protection for the 
technology cannot be justified, the counteracting patent-eligibility 
restriction could do more harm than good. A very strong rule of patent-
ineligibility might lead to a patent-curtailing departure from the norm that 
is greater in magnitude than the patent-permitting departure caused by the 
permissiveness of the patentability conditions.77 Counteracting restrictions 
on patent-eligibility should therefore be tailored to the bias that inheres in 
the patentability condition, at least to the extent that such tailoring is 
possible.78 Finally, counteraction can, in theory, come either from a 
restriction on patent-eligibility or a modification of a different patentability 
condition, but this Article only addresses counteraction through patent-
ineligibility.79  
 
 
 74. As a side note, counteraction theory’s aspiration to equal treatment for all technologies means 
that technology-specific restrictions on patent-eligibility are likely to be TRIPS-compliant. TRIPS 
mandates technological neutrality. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
art. 27, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299. If a restriction counteracts technology-specific laxity in a 
patentability condition, then it furthers, rather than undermines, technological neutrality. 
 75. For example, stronger protection may be a good idea because a technology has significant 
social value and the sunk costs of innovation are high. This is an example of the reasoning at the core of 
conventional discussions of technology-specific patent law: the economic innovation profile of a 
particular technology industry may differ from the norm in a way that recommends a departure from the 
norm in patent protection. See infra notes 281–282 and accompanying text. 
 76. See, e.g., infra notes 192–194 and accompanying text. 
 77. For example, the patent-ineligibility rule could be a categorical exclusion of an entire 
innovative endeavor. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.  
 78. The tailoring need not be perfect. The protection after counteraction must only be closer to the 
norm than it was before, so some over- or under-compensation in the counteraction can be tolerated. In 
fact, some over- or under-compensation may be preferable if the justification for a restriction on patent-
eligibility layers counteraction theory on top of discrimination theory. 
 79. In large part, this narrow focus follows directly from the task at hand, namely, exploring the 
ability of counteraction theory to provide a justification for the Supreme Court’s recent opinions on 
patent-ineligibility that are otherwise difficult to justify. See infra Sections II.D, III.C. Yet it also follows 
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To be more than a theoretical possibility, counteraction theory requires 
technology-specific biases in the patentability conditions in need of 
counteraction. It therefore calls for an explanation of when and why the 
patentability conditions are unable in a particular technology to do the 
regulatory work that we expect them to do. To provide that explanation, this 
Article introduces the concept of technology-specific regulatory inefficacy: 
the intrinsic properties of certain technologies undermine the ability of the 
patentability conditions to regulate patent validity.80  
A simple metaphor is useful here. Imagine that each of the validity 
doctrines is a unique tool for regulating what constitutes a permissible 
patent interest. When we think about three-dimensional, physical tools such 
as wrenches and screwdrivers, it is clear that a tool can only do the work 
that we expect it to do if the technology on which it is brought to bear has 
certain intrinsic properties. A crescent wrench can only do its intended work 
of tightening when there is a nut, or something with a similar shape, for the 
wrench to latch onto. If you try to use a crescent wrench to tighten a round-
headed screw, the normally effective tool is ineffective. The wrench suffers 
from technology-specific inefficacy: its ability to do the job that we expect 
it to do is contingent on the technology on which it is brought to bear 
possessing certain properties.81 
 
 
in part from a belief that discussions about which existing patent doctrine should effectuate the 
counteraction can easily devolve into a shell game—a meaningless and confusing passing of the “ball” 
(the substantive restriction on what can be patented) from one “shell” (statutory validity doctrine) to 
another. Technology-specific regulatory inefficacy means that the patentability condition that is the most 
intuitive home for a doctrine doing a particular type of regulatory work usually cannot do that work. But 
cf. infra note 273 and accompanying text (discussing algorithms as a software-specific patch for the 
regulatory inefficacy of means-plus-function claiming and written description). The counteraction 
therefore needs to be housed in either a patentability condition that normally does an entirely different 
type of work or in patent-ineligibility, and there is no clear reason to choose one over the other.  
 80. Interpreted broadly, technology-specific regulatory inefficacy can account for lapses in the 
patentability conditions that do not follow from a mismatch between the intrinsic nature of a technology 
and a patentability condition. For example, one argument offered to support restrictions on the patent-
eligibility of software and business methods is that the prior art in these fields is unusually difficult to 
identify. Dreyfuss, supra note 67, at 269. The difficulty of identifying prior art led to lax validity 
regulation which, in turn, supported a counteracting restriction on patent-eligibility. Here, the argument 
addresses technology-specific regulatory inefficacy in the novelty and nonobviousness doctrines, but it 
does not suggest that it is software’s intrinsic, technological properties that cause the inefficacy. Rather, 
novelty and nonobviousness are ineffective regulators because the cost of identifying prior art in the 
software arts is excessive.  
 81. The notion that the patentability conditions provide a set of “policy levers” for fine-tuning 
patent protection can readily be co-opted to reinforce the wrench metaphor. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra 
note 12, at 95. A lever is a simple technology, usually in the form of a straight, rigid bar, that is fixed at 
a point in the middle and that exerts force on an object at one end due to a force applied at the other end. 
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 780 (3d ed. 1993). As simple as a lever is, it only 
works if there is a point of resistance—the fixed point—that creates a pivot. Absent a pivot, the 
application of a force on one end of the bar does not exert the anticipated force at the other end. Many 
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Many of the patentability conditions are like physical tools in the sense 
that they can only do the regulatory work of invalidating costly patents when 
the claimed technologies possess certain fundamental properties. Some 
patentability conditions can only get leverage, traction, or grip when the 
claimed technologies have certain basic features onto which the 
patentability conditions can latch. When a technology lacks these basic 
features, technology-specific regulatory inefficacy ensues. The validity 
regulation imposed by the patentability conditions is lax, and, absent 
counteraction, applicants seeking to patent the technology receive 
preferential treatment in relation to applicants seeking to patent other 
technologies. 
Discussing the mismatch between doctrinal tools (patentability 
conditions) and claimed technologies that gives rise to technology-specific 
regulatory inefficacy in general terms is difficult because there is no single 
mismatch at issue. Different technologies resist the regulation of different 
patentability conditions, and different patentability conditions latch onto 
different intrinsic properties of the claimed technology. This Article 
therefore proceeds on the assumption that the best proof is in the pudding: 
the best way to understand technology-specific regulatory inefficacy is 
through deep-dive examples that illustrate how and why the intrinsic nature 
of a particular technology undermines the ability of a particular patentability 
condition to regulate patent validity. The following two Parts explore the 
technology-specific regulatory inefficacy that arises when patents claim 
diagnostic inferences and software.82  
Nonetheless, despite the difficulty of discussing technology-specific 
regulatory inefficacy in general, there is one overarching observation that 
helps to explain not only what technology-specific regulatory inefficacy is 
but also why it exists. While the wrench metaphor provides a useful trope,83 
it should not be taken literally. A patentability condition will never become 
ineffective simply because it is brought to bear on round, rather than 
hexagonal, widgets. A far deeper change in the nature of technology is at 
issue: to the extent that diagnostic inferences and software are reliable 
guides, intangibility plays a critical role in triggering regulatory inefficacy. 
 
 
patentability conditions are legal technologies that, like metaphorical levers, only work if the claimed 
technologies possess certain fundamental properties. Bringing a patentability condition to bear on a 
technology that lacks those properties is like trying to use a lever without a pivot point: the tool simply 
cannot do the work that we expect it to do. 
 82. Each Part also examines the fit between the restrictions on patent-eligibility justified by 
counteraction theory and the restrictions announced in the Supreme Court’s recent patent-ineligibility 
opinions. See infra Sections II.D and III.C. 
 83. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.  
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The patentability conditions work as we expect them to in tangible, 
industrial-era technologies like the mechanical and chemical arts. However, 
when brought to bear on more recently developed information-processing 
technologies like software and diagnostic inferences that have very light 
footprints in the material world of extension,84 the patentability conditions 
sometimes falter. It is nothing less than the well-documented 
dematerialization of technology over the last half century that has altered 
technology at the fundamental level needed to trigger regulatory inefficacy 
in the patentability conditions.85  
The correlation between intangibility and regulatory inefficacy points to 
a path-dependence origin story for the technology-specific nature of 
regulatory inefficacy. The actors who crafted patent law did not 
intentionally bake technology specificity into the law. Rather, they crafted 
doctrine that treated the then-extant technology in a technologically neutral 
manner, and the technological specificity arose later as byproduct of the 
unforeseen evolution of technology over time. When modern patent law was 
created in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,86 the technology 
for which patents were sought was synonymous with tangible, industrial-
era technology. The tangible nature of technology was taken for granted as 
part and parcel of all technology. As Robert Merges colorfully notes, 
everyone assumed that “if you put technology in a bag and shook it, it would 
make some noise” in the early years of the patent regime.87 Thus, although 
the legal actors who iteratively refined the patentability conditions likely 
intended to create technologically neutral law, their bounded imagination 
 
 
 84. Both technologies have been implicated in machine-or-transformation test cases in which the 
Federal Circuit attempted to reinvigorate intangibility as a limit on patent-eligibility. Ass’n for 
Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent &Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 1333–37 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
(diagnostic inferences); Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, Inc., 657 F.3d 1323, 1326–27 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(software).  
 85. Taken literally, dematerialization means achieving the same, or greater, functionality with less 
physical matter. Robert Herman, Siamak A. Ardekani & Jesse H. Ausubel, Dematerialization, 38 
TECHNOLOGICAL FORECASTING AND SOCIAL CHANGE 333, 333 (1990). Some manifestations of 
dematerialization do not cause regulatory inefficacy in the patentability conditions. New materials and 
molecules, better designs, and smaller tolerances in manufacturing mean that today’s mechanical gizmos 
can be smaller and lighter than yesterday’s. Even the sharing economy can be framed as a cause of 
dematerialization to the extent that one car or bike can satisfy the needs of many consumers. JOHN 
THACKARA, IN THE BUBBLE: DESIGNING IN A COMPLEX WORLD 18–19 (2005). The aspect of 
technological dematerialization that gives rise to technology-specific regulatory inefficacy is more 
specifically the development of new technologies that are based on information processing, whether 
done within the human mind (diagnostic inferences) or outside of it (software).  
 86. The 1952 Patent Act, which remains the core of contemporary patent law, largely codified the 
doctrine developed in the courts over the prior century. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–376 (2012). 
 87. Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for 
Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 585 (1999). 
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prevented them from being able to do so. They were only able to craft 
patentability conditions that were technology-neutral with respect to what 
they conceived patentable technology to be, (i.e., with respect to tangible 
technologies). Without the ability to conceive of dematerialization and how 
it would change the fundamental properties of patentable technology, they 
could not craft patentability conditions that would effectively regulate 
dematerialized technologies such as software and diagnostic inferences.  
II. PROOF OF CONCEPT: DIAGNOSTIC INFERENCES AND MAYO 
In Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories,88 the 
Supreme Court held that a diagnostic-inference claim was patent-ineligible 
because it described a law of nature in the abstract.89 The majority of 
commentators who have addressed Mayo have argued that it has no viable 
consequentialist defense, and they have implicitly structured their 
arguments around discrimination theory.90 The argument below shifts from 
discrimination theory to counteraction theory, and, by doing so, it is able to 
offer reasonable, although concededly imperfect, support for the Court’s 
restriction on patent-eligibility articulated in Mayo.  
Section II.A explains that, while most patent limitations read on extra-
mental activity, diagnostic-inference claims have limitations that describe 
the manipulation of meaningful mental states in thinkers’ minds. The 
following two sections demonstrate that two core patentability conditions 
cannot do their usual regulatory work when patents claim the manipulation 
of meaningful mental states as an invention. Section II.B details why 
inherency cannot reduce patent density, and Section II.C explains why 
overbreadth cannot curtail patent generality. Given this technology-specific 
regulatory inefficacy in the patentability conditions, Section II.D then 
examines the fit between the restriction on the patent-eligibility of 
diagnostic inferences that can be justified under counteraction theory and 
the restriction announced in Mayo.  
A. Diagnostic Inferences Manipulate Meaningful Mental States 
The Mayo claim is a method of optimizing a patient’s dosage of a 
thiopurine drug to treat an autoimmune disorder.91 Patients metabolize 
 
 
 88. 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). 
 89. Id.  
 90. See infra notes 172–175 and accompanying text.  
 91. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1295.  
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thiopurine drugs into metabolites. Prior to the Mayo researchers’ work, the 
amount of the metabolites in patients’ bloodstreams was already known to 
be medically significant in a general way. Too little metabolite was known 
to correlate with a significant risk of inefficacy, and too much with a 
significant risk of toxicity. But the precise upper and lower limits of the 
optimal window of metabolite concentration were unknown.92 The Mayo 
researchers identified these limits, quantifying the correlations between 
metabolite levels and the points at which each type of medical risk grows to 
be too great. Based on this work, they obtained a patent on the following 
representative claim:  
A method of optimizing therapeutic efficacy for treatment of an 
[autoimmune] disorder, comprising: 
(a) administering a [thiopurine] drug . . . to a subject . . . and 
(b) determining the level of [a particular metabolite] in said subject 
. . . 
wherein the level of [the metabolite] less than [a lower threshold] 
indicates a need to increase the amount of said drug subsequently 
administered to said subject and 
wherein the level of [the metabolite] greater than [an upper 
threshold] indicates a need to decrease the amount of said drug 
subsequently administered to said subject.93  
Although the claim is drafted with only two lettered steps, the Supreme 
Court parsed it into three limitations.94 To infringe, a doctor must, first, 
administer the drug to a patient and, second, determine the patient’s 
metabolite level. Third, as specified in the wherein clauses, the doctor must 
diagnose her patient by inferring a need to adjust the drug dosage up or 
down if the metabolite level is below or above the optimal window, 
respectively.95 Importantly, the wherein clauses contain the method’s sole 
advance over the prior art. Doctors had been performing the administering 
and determining steps prior to the Mayo researchers’ work.96 What they 
 
 
 92. Id.  
 93. Id.  
 94. Id. at 1297.  
 95. Id. at 1296. No post-diagnosis, extra-mental action is required for infringement. The wherein 
clause is satisfied “if the doctor believes” that an adjustment “is the proper procedure.” Prometheus 
Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., No. 04cv1200 JAH (RBB), slip op. at 17–18 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 
22, 2005).  
 96. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1295. 
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hadn’t been doing is using particular upper or lower thresholds in the 
metabolite levels to diagnose a need to decrease or increase drug dosage. 
The third step of the wherein clauses is a diagnostic inference. In its 
generic form, a diagnostic inference is an act of logical reasoning involving 
two factual premises and a factual conclusion: 
Premise 1:  An individual patient has attribute X. 
Premise 2:  In general, patients who have attribute X 
are likely to have attribute Y.  
Conclusion:  Said individual patient is likely to have 
attribute Y.97  
Of course, a claim to this generic diagnostic inference in which X and Y 
are meaningless variables lacks novelty. Researchers therefore only claim 
species of diagnostic inferences. They do this by reciting the meanings of 
variables X and Y as claim limitations. More specifically, researchers 
usually discover a previously unknown, empirically valid correlation, and 
they draft a claim to a diagnostic inference that employs this correlation as 
Premise 2.98 For example, the wherein clauses of the Mayo claim describe 
the following diagnostic-inference species:  
Premise 1:  My individual patient has a metabolite 
level above [a specified upper threshold]. 
Premise 2:  In general, patients who have metabolite 
levels above [a specified upper threshold] 
are likely to benefit from a reduction in 
drug dosage.  
Conclusion:  My individual patient is likely to benefit 
from a reduction in drug dosage.99  
The need to establish novelty means that the diagnostic inferences for 
which inventors seek patent protection manipulate meaningful mental states 
or what are commonly called mental representations in cognitive science 
 
 
 97. More generally, a diagnostic inference is an example of a statistical syllogism. K. CODELL 
CARTER, A FIRST COURSE IN LOGIC 136 (2004). 
 98. Although the correlation exists before a researcher discovers it, the mental state that embodies 
human thought about the correlation comes into being at the moment of the correlation’s discovery, and 
it is thus a novel mental state. See infra notes 128–129 and accompanying text. 
 99. The wherein clauses also describe a diagnostic inference premised on the correlation between 
low metabolite levels and a need to increase drug dosage. 
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and cognitive psychology.100 Mental representations are “physical-
biological states [that] have representational content—they are about things, 
inside or outside of an organism, and represent them as being such and 
such” within the mind.101 Mental representations thus exist inside the mind, 
but they have states of affairs that exist in the material world of extension 
outside the mind as their representational content. Mental representations 
are central to how our minds work. They are nothing less than the locus of 
factual knowledge itself: “[i]t is because we have mental states with the 
capacity to represent that we can have knowledge.”102 Under a standard, 
cognitive-science account of rational human thought, the brain is a 
biological system that stores and recalls mental representations, much like 
a computer stores and manipulates meaningful variables when it processes 
information.103 “To infer a proposition q from the propositions p and if p 
then q is … to have a sequence of [mental representations] of the form p, if 
p then q, q.”104  
Diagnostic inferences are exceptional technologies when compared to 
run-of-the-mill patentable subject matters. The vast majority of patented 
technologies are things or processes that exist in the extra-mental world of 
extension, but diagnostic inferences involve the logical processing of mental 
representations in thinkers’ minds.105 To be clear about the nature of 
diagnostic-inference patents, two points need to be highlighted. First, claims 
to diagnostic inferences do not privatize mental representations themselves 
in the abstract. That is, a doctor does not infringe the Mayo claim by simply 
understanding that Premise 1 or Premise 2 above is true. Rather, claims to 
diagnostic inferences describe the use of meaningful mental states 
functioning as premises and conclusion in an act of logical reasoning.106 
Second, only the representational content of the manipulated mental states 
can usually differentiate a claimed inference from prior art inferences. The 
correlations that researchers discover are usually phenomena or states of 
 
 
 100. JAEGWON KIM, PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 240 (2d ed. 2006).  
 101. Id.  
 102. Id. at 24–25. Technically, we only have knowledge when we have “mental representations with 
true contents—that is, representations that correctly represent” the world outside the mind. Id. at 25.  
 103. ANDY CLARK, MINDWARE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF COGNITIVE SCIENCE 
28–33 (2001); David Pitt, Mental Representation § 8, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL., 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mental-representation/ (last visited June 16, 2015).  
 104. Pitt, supra note 103, at § 1. 
 105. Although mental reasoning is almost always a critical input and/or output of the innovation 
process, Kevin Emerson Collins, The Knowledge/Embodiment Dichotomy, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1279, 
1293–94 (2014), very few inventors hold out a newly created mental act of reasoning as the novel aspect 
of the claimed invention. 
 106. Pitt, supra note 103, at § 1. 
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affairs in the world that pre-date the researchers’ work.107 Metabolite levels 
above the specified upper threshold were causing medically problematic 
toxicity problems before the Mayo researchers made their discovery. 
However, logical thought that employs the correlation as a premise is a 
novel “invention” created by the researcher. Prior to the discovery of the 
correlation between elevated metabolite levels and toxicity risks, nobody 
had a mental representation of the correlation, and nobody could perform a 
diagnostic inference using the correlation as a premise. The act of reasoning 
encompassed by the wherein limitations of the Mayo claim is therefore 
novel. In fact, the sole locus of the advance over the prior art in the Mayo 
claim is the content of the representation that functions as Premise 2, namely 
the newly quantified correlation between metabolite levels and ill-advised 
medical risk.  
B. Inherency and Patent Density 
The inherency doctrine is a branch of the novelty doctrine that denies 
patent protection to inventors who generate new knowledge about an 
existing product or process without generating a new product or process.108 
That is, inherency makes “the categorical judgment that an invention 
already being used by the public shouldn’t be patentable because someone 
discovers information [i.e., knowledge] about how it works.”109  
When patents claim extra-mental technologies, inherency is an effective 
regulator of patent validity. It screens costly claims out of the patent regime 
by invalidating claims that are likely to create excessive patent density. 
However, when patents claim diagnostic inferences, inherency cannot do 
this work. Inherency is only an effective regulator when there is a clean 
distinction between newly created bits of knowledge (not protectable) and 
newly created inventions (protectable). This distinction breaks down when 
an invention is nothing more than the manipulation of newly created mental 
representations in thinkers’ minds because mental representations are 
nothing but newly created knowledge.  
1. Inherency Usually Reduces Density 
Inherency is a well-accepted limit on patentability, and it plays a critical 
 
 
 107. Whether the correlations are natural phenomena is a much more difficult question that, 
thankfully, is irrelevant if Mayo is given a mind-centered interpretation. See infra text accompanying 
note 177. 
 108. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 109. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Inherency, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 371, 383–84 (2005).  
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role in shaping patent protection as we know it today.110 For example, 
assume that there are three metal alloys in the prior art commonly used 
under highly corrosive conditions and that a researcher discovers the fact 
that one of them has vastly superior corrosion-resistance properties. The 
researcher has made a real contribution to technological progress. He has 
generated previously unknown, useful knowledge that will change how 
products are made. Nonetheless, inherency denies him patent protection.111 
He could attempt to use his newly discovered knowledge to draft a claim 
that describes the already-existing, high-performing alloy in a new way. For 
example, he could attempt to seek a claim to a process of using an alloy with 
vastly superior anti-corrosive properties under highly corrosive conditions. 
However, this claim is invalid under the inherency doctrine. The later-
discovered property of the alloy (its superior anti-corrosive property) was 
an inherent property of the prior-art technology, so the claim lacks 
novelty.112 Similarly, a researcher who discovers that eating a lot of broccoli 
helps to prevent cancer cannot patent a method of reducing the risk of cancer 
by eating a lot of broccoli because people have been ignorantly performing 
that method for many years.113 
Inherency screens costly claims out of the patent regime because it 
reduces patent density.114 Excessive patent density follows from the 
efficient scale for using a resource being significantly larger than the scale 
at which the property regime doles out privately owned parcels.115 By 
 
 
 110. Some issues at the periphery of inherency are controversial. See, e.g., Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 
U.S. 707, 711–12 (1880) (finding no inherency when prior-art technology came about “accidentally and 
unwittingly”); In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (addressing inherency when the prior 
art is a text that describes a thing, not a material embodiment of the thing). The aspect of inherency 
addressed below, however, lies at the doctrine’s uncontroversial core. 
 111. Provided, that is, that the researcher does not claim a mental process that manipulates a mental 
representation that has the newly discovered fact as its content. See infra Section II.B.2. 
 112. Cf. Titanium Metals Corp. v. Banner, 778 F.2d 775 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that a claim to a 
metal alloy lacks novelty when the inventor discovered a previously unknown property of the alloy).  
 113. In re Cruciferous Sprout Litig., 301 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2002). See also King Pharms., Inc. v. 
Eon Labs, Inc., 616 F.3d 1267, 1270–71 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding that a researcher who discovered that 
the bioavailability of a prior-art drug increases when it is consumed with food could not patent 
consuming the drug with food).  
 114. Inherency is commonly also justified with the argument that a per se rule preventing inventors 
from claiming prior art technologies ensures that inventors are not over-rewarded in relation to their 
contributions to progress. Burk & Lemley, supra note 109, at 383–84. However, there are many 
situations in which we allow inventors to reach beyond their contributions to amass sufficient incentives. 
For example, patents routinely reach into after-arising technology produced by later innovators. Kevin 
Emerson Collins, Enabling After-Arising Technology, 34 J. CORP. L. 1083 (2009). Inherency should be 
understood as a means of limiting patent density, not solely as a means of achieving proportionality of 
contribution and reward.  
 115. This fragmentation problem is not specific to patent law: the efficient geographical scale for 
using land can be significantly larger than the geographical scale of the parcels of private property. 
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denying patent protection to innovators who generate new knowledge about 
how technology works but who do not produce new, extra-mental things or 
processes, inherency eliminates one way in which patent applicants can add 
another layer of patent rights on top of the patent rights already governing 
extant technologies. If inherency were not enforced, a researcher could 
obtain a patent every time he created new knowledge about a useful property 
of a known product or process. The resulting increase in patent density 
would be significant. By definition, any product or process has an enormous 
number of distinct properties,116 and technological knowledge pertaining to 
how a thing or system works is usually generated in a slow, dripping fashion 
rather than all at once.117  
Enforcing inherency has social costs: researchers today have no direct, 
patent-induced incentives to generate welfare-enhancing technological 
knowledge about existing products and processes.118 Yet, the cost of the 
absent incentives is presumed to be smaller than the benefit of the reduction 
in patent density. Inherency’s curb on patent density provides socially 
valuable validity regulation because excessive density creates two 
problems. First, there is what has alternatively been styled an 
anticommons,119 thicket,120 or disaggregation121 problem. Higher patent 
density places a larger number of parties at the table in the negotiations that 
must occur to assemble the rights needed to authorize the large-scale use. 
The larger number of parties, in turn, increases the likelihood that 
transaction costs or strategic behavior will undermine any single party’s 
 
 
Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1333 (1993); Michael A. Heller, The 
Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 
(1998); Frank I. Michelman, Ethics, Economics, and the Law of Property, in 24 NOMOS: ETHICS, 
ECONOMICS, AND THE LAW 3, 11–19 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1982), reprinted in 
39 TULSA L. REV. 663 (2004). 
 116. Chris Daly, Properties, in 7 ROUTLEDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 757 (Edward Craig 
ed., 1998) (“A property is . . . an entity that things . . . have.”).  
 117. Scientific, factual knowledge about the properties of any given system grows in a slow, 
dripping fashion even if scientific progress writ large is sometimes discontinuous. See THOMAS KUHN, 
THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962) (contrasting paradigm shifts with normal 
science). 
 118. Patent law does create some incentives by protecting complementary inventions. Someone who 
discovers that eating broccoli reduces the risk of cancer, see supra note 113 and accompanying text, 
could patent methods of growing broccoli that increase the concentration of its cancer-fighting 
chemicals.  
 119. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons 
in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698 (1998). 
 120. Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard 
Setting, 1 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 119 (2000). 
 121. Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2117 (2013). 
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acquisition of the fragmented rights. High patent density may therefore 
cause the development or commercialization of a useful technology to be 
inefficiently overpriced (even for a rational monopolist), delayed, or 
stymied.122 Second, patent density reduces incentives for innovators to 
produce significant inventions. A new technology generates a given welfare 
increase, and denser patenting spreads this surplus over a larger group of 
inventors. If some inventors’ contributions are more important and costly 
than others, then giving minor contributors some of the surplus leaves less 
for the major contributors.123  
2. Technology-Specific Regulatory Inefficacy 
When patents claim diagnostic inferences, inherency is an ineffective 
regulator. It cannot do the work of reducing patent density that it can do 
when patents claim extra-mental technologies. For a simple illustration of 
inherency’s inefficacy, consider a three-researcher scenario that extends the 
facts of Mayo. The first researchers are the actual Mayo researchers. They 
discover a correlation between the concentration of a thiopurine metabolite 
in a patient’s blood being over a specified threshold and the patient being 
more likely to suffer toxicity-related adverse side effects. They receive 
roughly the representative Mayo claim: 
(a) determining whether a patient has a metabolite level above the 
specified threshold and, if he does,  
(b) inferring that the patient is in need of a decrease in his dosage of 
the thiopurine drug.124  
Now assume that two subsequent researchers perform follow-on 
experiments that reveal different events in the biochemical pathway through 
which the body metabolizes thiopurine drugs. The second researcher 
discovers that the metabolite only exists in the body as a complex of the 
metabolite and chemical X. The second researcher obtains a diagnostic-
inference patent on:  
 
 
 122. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 119, at 700–01; Lemley & Melamed, supra note 121, at 2158–
59; Shapiro, supra note 120, at 122–26.  
 123. ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 609 (6th ed. 2013).  
 124. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. The first, administering step of the actual claim is 
excised for the sake of brevity, but this simplification does not affect the analysis. In fact, the Mayo 
patent contained a similar two-step claim whose patent-eligibility rose and fell with the validity of the 
three-step claim. Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 628 F.3d 1347, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 
2010). 
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(a) determining whether a patient has a level of the metabolite-and-
chemical-X complex above the specified threshold and, if he does,  
(b) inferring that the patient is in need of a decrease in his dosage of 
the thiopurine drug.  
The third researcher discovers that a high metabolite level causes a buildup 
of protein Y that, in turn, leads to the adverse side effect. The third 
researcher obtains a diagnostic-inference patent on:  
(a) determining whether a patient has a level of the metabolite above 
the specified threshold and, if he does,  
(b) inferring that the patient has an unhealthy buildup of protein Y 
that should be remedied by a decrease in the dosage of the thiopurine 
drug.  
If all three claims were valid, patent density would clearly be significant. 
Three claims, owned by different entities, would all govern what is the same 
diagnostic test, at least when what constitutes a single diagnostic test is 
defined from the perspective of a clinical doctor who treats patients. But the 
density is not capped at three patents. The three-researcher scenario only 
scratches the surface of the diagnostic-inference patents that future 
researchers could obtain. It employs only two reactions in the metabolic 
pathway through which thiopurine drugs affect the body, and most 
pathways chain together far more than two reactions. Each reaction in the 
pathway presents an opportunity for the discovery of yet another correlation 
and the creation of yet another diagnostic inference that is ripe for patenting. 
More broadly, the density concern raised by the three-researcher Mayo 
hypothetical exists in the routine, real-world scenario in which 
technological progress reveals knowledge about the properties of how a 
system works in a slow, dripping fashion rather than all at once.125 The 
particulars of the hypothetical employ naïve science, but they realistically 
illustrate how scientific knowledge usually grows.126 
 
 
 125. See supra notes 116–117 and accompanying text. 
 126. No high-profile cases resembling the three-researcher scenario have yet been litigated, but this 
fact alone does not undermine the reality of the costs of inherency’s inefficacy. The patents that inventors 
seek are largely determined by the conventions and expectations of patent attorneys who draft patent 
claims. If Mayo had upheld the validity of diagnostic-inference claims, patent drafters would soon have 
recognized that all three claims in the three-researcher Mayo scenario are valid, the conventions of claim 
drafting would have shifted, and patent drafters would have regularly sought such claims. Patent drafters 
are known to be a wily bunch, see Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978) (discussing how patent-
ineligibility must be sufficiently robust to avoid evasion through “the draftsman’s art”), and they rarely 
leave value for their clients on the table over the long term. 
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At first glance, inherency might seem like it would invalidate the latter 
two patents and stave off the problem of excessive patent density. Inherency 
routinely invalidates claims that use newly discovered properties of old 
processes to describe the old things and processes in a new way,127 and the 
second and third claims in the three-researcher scenario seem to do exactly 
this. They use newly created knowledge to describe the diagnostic inference 
invented by the first researcher in a new way in the claim. That is, they 
attempt to leverage a new description of an old technology into a novel 
claim. However, inherency cannot invalidate either of the two latter claims. 
Each of the three researchers’ claims describes a mental process that did not 
exist in the prior art. The acts of thinking about a metabolite, a metabolite-
and-chemical-X complex, and a build-up of protein Y are three separate acts 
of thinking, even if all three distinct acts of thinking are clinically 
interchangeable acts of thinking about the same metabolic system. Nobody 
can think about a discovery before the discovery has been made; nobody 
can use a bit of knowledge in an act of mental reasoning until that bit of 
knowledge is known. Therefore, the researchers’ claims are all novel, and 
they are not inherent in the prior art. 
The underlying general point is that inherency only works when there is 
a distinction between a novel product or process, on the one hand, and newly 
created knowledge about that product or process, on the other. When patents 
claim extra-mental technologies, this distinction exists. But it does not exist 
when patents claim processes that manipulate novel mental representations. 
Every bit of newly created knowledge is nothing but a novel mental 
representation in thinkers’ minds,128 so every newly discovered property of 
a product or process generates a novel mental state.129 In turn, every mental 
process that employs a novel mental representation is also by definition 
novel. When patents claim mental processes that manipulate meaningful 
mental states, inherency doctrine never prevents an inventor from obtaining 
patent protection: the discovery of new knowledge entails the creation of a 
novel mental state and thus a novel mental process that manipulates that 
novel mental state. 
In sum, inherency suffers from technology-specific regulatory inefficacy 
when it is brought to bear on diagnostic-inference patents. It cannot do the 
work of thinning out patent density that it does for other types of patents. It 
 
 
 127. See supra Section II.B.1.  
 128. See supra notes 100–104 and accompanying text. 
 129. Mental representations that have newly discovered facts as their content are not pre-existing 
mental states; they are not inherent in our minds prior to the discovery. If they were, then no diagnostic 
inference claim would ever be novel. 
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cannot prevent a novel diagnostic-inference “already being used by the 
public” from being subject to a new layer of patent rights every time 
“someone discovers information about how it works.”130 By describing the 
use of newly created mental representations in thinkers’ minds, diagnostic-
inference patents launder newly discovered properties of metabolic systems 
into novel patents, even when other diagnostic inferences with identical 
clinical utilities already exist in the prior art.131 Inherency cannot prevent a 
dense accumulation of patents on what a doctor views as a single diagnostic 
inference with a single clinical utility when researchers repeatedly discover 
new properties of the body’s metabolic processes.132  
The practical consequences of this patent density could take either one 
of two different forms, depending on how the courts deal with another 
unique attribute of mental technology, namely, its nonvolitional nature. The 
conduct that infringes a patent on an extra-mental technology is always a 
volitional act, so the infringer at least intends to perform the act that 
constitutes infringement even if he does not know that he is committing 
infringement. In contrast, the conduct that satisfies a patent’s diagnostic-
inference limitation is almost always a nonvolitional or reflexive act once 
 
 
 130. Burk & Lemley, supra note 109, at 383–84. Dan Burk and Mark Lemley argue for a “public 
benefit” theory to determine inherency’s limits: if a researcher discovers a new property of an old 
process, the researcher should be able to claim the old process without an inherency bar if the public had 
not been receiving the benefit of the newly discovered property. Id. at 375–89. Inherency’s inefficacy 
when confronted with diagnostic-inference claims is consistent with, but not required by, Burk and 
Lemley’s vision of inherency. It addresses the inverse situation: it demonstrates that there is no inherency 
bar if a claim describes a truly novel process, even if the old and new processes are perfect economic 
substitutes and the public had been receiving all the benefit of the new process from its use of the old 
process.  
 131. Addressing genetic diagnostics in particular, some commentators raise concerns about patent 
density when patents are granted on a gene-by-gene basis and diagnostics examine multiple genes or 
even the full genome. SECY’S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH & SOC’Y, GENE PATENTS AND 
LICENSING PRACTICES AND THEIR IMPACT ON PATIENT ACCESS TO GENETIC TESTS at 3, 41, 49–52 
(2010) [hereinafter SACGHS REPORT]; Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The Patentability of Genetic Diagnostics 
in U.S. Law and Policy, in PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION, COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW: A 
TRILATERAL PERSPECTIVE, 7, 7–8 (Josef Drexl & Nari Lee eds., 2013). The fragmentation concern 
raised by inherency’s inefficacy is conceptually distinct. What is commonly viewed as a single 
correlation between a gene and a clinical condition is in fact a bundle of distinct correlations, each of 
which can give rise to a novel diagnostic-inference patent. Inherency’s inefficacy therefore compounds 
the density created by the multiple-gene problem. 
 132. Nor can other patentability conditions step in to do the work that inherency usually does. Utility 
cannot do the needed work. Although the three diagnostics considered in the text have identical clinical 
utilities, an invention does not have to work better than the prior art to be statutorily useful. Lowell v. 
Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8568). Utility sanctions patents on perfect economic 
substitutes. Nor can nonobviousness do the needed work. Each of the diagnostic inferences is likely to 
be nonobvious so long as the newly discovered fact that enables the inference is unexpected. United 
States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 48–52 (1966) (establishing that unexpected results weigh strongly in favor 
of nonobviousness). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
988 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 94:955 
 
 
 
 
the thinker has knowledge of the requisite factual premises.133 When we say 
that a thinker jumps to a conclusion, we don’t mean that the thinker makes 
a volitional decision to jump. The jump just happens. The reflexive nature 
of a diagnostic inference means that a doctor who has tested metabolite 
levels and is aware of the relevant medical literature will inevitably perform 
all three claims in the three-researcher scenario.134 
The nonvolitional nature of a diagnostic inference raises an open issue 
of patent law: Should nonvolitional conduct trigger strict liability for patent 
infringement?135 How courts answer this question determines the nature of 
the costs of the patent density in the three-researcher Mayo hypothetical. On 
the one hand, if courts were to hold that any performance of the claimed 
diagnostic inference, whether volitional or not, amounts to infringement, 
then inherency’s inefficacy would produce a classic thicket or anticommons 
problem.136 On the other hand, courts could hold that patent owners must 
demonstrate intent to perform a diagnostic inference to prove 
infringement.137 If courts were to take this route, inherency’s inefficacy 
would lead to a different cost: the cost of unenforceability. Each of the 
patent owners in the three-researcher hypothetical would find it extremely 
difficult to prove that a doctor had the intent to perform his claimed 
inference in particular. A doctor can always assert that she intended to 
perform an inference other than the one described in the claim being 
litigated. Given that mental states are not directly accessible to anyone other 
than the thinker,138 proving that a doctor intended to make one inference 
rather than another is a nearly impossible task. In this situation, inherency’s 
inefficacy produces a form of fragmentation in which the problem is not the 
overlapping rights of a thicket but rather the porous rights of an archipelago: 
 
 
 133. Kevin Emerson Collins, Constructive Nonvolition in Patent Law and the Problem of 
Insufficient Thought Control, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 759, 794–96. 
 134. In Metabolite Laboratories, Inc. v. Laboratory Corp., the Federal Circuit assumed that any 
doctor who knew the factual inferences proceeded to perform the diagnostic inference, reasoning that it 
would be malpractice for a doctor not to do so. Metabolite Labs. v. Lab. Corp., 370 F.3d 1354, 1364 
(Fed. Cir. 2004).  
 135. Patent infringement is a strict liability offense: even someone who lacks knowledge of his legal 
status as an infringer can be held liable. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. 
Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 645 (1999). 
 136. See supra notes 115–123 and accompanying text. 
 137. Collins, supra note 133, at 782–87 (discussing the intent that could be required). An intent 
requirement makes sense because strict liability for nonvolitional conduct would over-reward inventors. 
Id. at 804–12. 
 138. KIM, supra note 100, at 19. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss4/8
  
 
 
 
 
2017] PATENT-INELIGIBILITY AS COUNTERACTION 989 
 
 
 
 
 
If intent must be shown in order to prove infringement, the rights of the 
owners of diagnostic-inference patents exist as scattered islands through 
which doctors can easily sail without running aground. It is not because the 
alleged infringer doesn’t use any patented technology (he likely does), but 
rather because the patent owner cannot prove infringement. If researchers 
know this result in advance, then diagnostic-inference patents will not create 
much of any incentive to innovate in the first place. 
C. Overbreadth and Patent Generality 
When patents claim extra-mental technologies, overbreadth screens 
costly claims out of the patent regime by capping permissible claim 
generality. When patents claim diagnostic inferences, however, overbreadth 
cannot do this regulatory work. Overbreadth only curbs generality when 
generality is a set-theoretical construct, and the generality of a mental 
representation is not a set-theoretical construct. To the contrary, individual 
mental representations can be intrinsically general. 
1. Overbreadth Usually Curbs Generality  
When patent claims describe extra-mental technologies, claim generality 
is a set-theoretical construct: the metric for determining claim generality is 
the size of the set of distinct technologies that fit the claim’s description.139 
For example, consider a trip up a simple ladder of claim generality: a claim 
can describe a Phillips screwdriver, a screwdriver, a hand tool, or a tool. 
 
 
 139. PETER D. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS 42–44 (1975); Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The 
Formal Structure of Patent Law and the Limits of Enablement, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1141, 1145 
(2008). While the generality of the claimed technology is a set-theoretical construct, the language used 
to delineate claim scope can have something resembling intrinsic generality. For example, the word 
“rhomboid” is intrinsically more general than the word “square.” Descriptive language and mental 
representations can both have intrinsic generality because they are representations that can have general 
content. See infra note 161. 
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The tool claim is more general than a hand-tool claim because there are 
things that are tools but not hand tools (e.g., table saws and drill presses). 
Similarly, a hand-tool claim is more general than a screwdriver claim 
because some hand tools are not screwdrivers (e.g., hammers and 
wrenches). Critically, the set-theoretical nature of claim generality means 
that generality is a characteristic of the claim, not any individual 
embodiment of technology.140 There is no such thing as an intrinsically 
general, real-world embodiment of a technology that can infringe a patent 
claim. For example, there is no thing-in-the-world that itself embodies the 
generality of the description “hand tool.” Any device that falls within a 
general hand-tool claim also falls within some more specific claim such as 
a screwdriver, wrench, or hammer claim. The description “hand tool” has 
generality because it aggregates a large number of distinct technologies into 
a single category. When claim generality is a set-theoretical construct, 
generality is only a property of a description in a claim, and it is not a 
property of an infringing device or method in the world. Generality without 
specificity is impossible in concrete embodiments of a technology. 
Patent law’s overbreadth doctrines latch onto the set-theoretical nature 
of claim generality to curb permissible claim generality. They compare two 
sets of technologies: the set that an inventor contributes to technological 
progress in his specification or disclosure and the set described by the claim. 
They invalidate any claim for which the claimed set is excessively large in 
relation to the disclosed set. Highly general claims are more likely to be 
overbroad in relation to a patent’s disclosure because general claims 
encompass larger sets of distinct technologies, and these larger sets are more 
likely to be too large in relation to the set of disclosed technologies. For 
example, if an inventor discloses a set of Phillips screwdrivers, his Phillips-
screwdriver claim would likely be valid, but his hand-tool claim would 
likely be invalid.  
There are two patent doctrines that both employ the principle of 
overbreadth to cap permissible claim generality. Each one imposes a 
different requirement on what it means for an inventor to have contributed 
an embodiment of a technology to technological progress. First, enablement 
focuses on the disclosure of information about how to make and use a 
technology: claim scope must remain commensurate with the set of 
technologies that the disclosure teaches the person having ordinary skill in 
the art to make and use without undue experimentation at the time of 
 
 
 140. That is, generality is a characteristic of types, not tokens, or of collections, not individuals. 
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filing.141 Written description, in contrast, focuses on the disclosure of 
information about the physical structure of a technology, mandating that 
claim scope must remain commensurate with the set of technologies that a 
person of ordinary skill who has read the disclosure recognizes that an 
inventor “possessed” or “invented” at the time of filing.142 Thus, although 
each looks at a different type of information, both examine the 
commensurability of the disclosure and the claim.  
To risk repetition, overbreadth limits claim generality only because 
generality is a set-theoretical construct. When claim generality is a set-
theoretical construct, inventors never invent, or thus disclose, an individual 
embodiment of a technology with intrinsic generality matching the 
generality of the claim. There is no single embodiment of a tool that an 
inventor can disclose that, by itself, matches the generality of the description 
“hand tool.” Rather, inventors always invent and disclose sets of concrete 
embodiments. As claim generality grows, the claimed set will grow to be 
outsized in relation to the disclosed set unless the disclosed set, too, grows. 
Overcoming overbreadth’s limit on claim generality by providing a more 
robust disclosure of a larger set of technologies becomes impossible at some 
point because it requires an inventor to disclose additional embodiments that 
the inventor cannot yet make or conceive. The inventor of the first hand tool 
must invent a specific tool such as a screwdriver. This inventor likely does 
not have the knowledge of hammers and wrenches that must be disclosed to 
support a general hand-tool claim.143  
For an example of how the set-theoretical nature of claim generality 
allows overbreadth to curb permissible claim generality, consider the 
Supreme Court’s analysis of Samuel Morse’s claims to a telegraph 
machine.144 Morse, like most patent applicants, sought and obtained 
multiple claims at several nested levels of generality.145 His more specific 
claims were limited to machines that possessed various structural features 
of the telegraph machine that Morse actually invented.146 His most general 
claim encompassed all telegraph machines, regardless of their structural 
 
 
 141. In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839 (C.C.P.A. 1970). 
 142. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
Possession and invention, in turn, are legal code for an inventor disclosing the technology’s defining 
structural properties. Kevin Emerson Collins, Patent Law’s Functionality Malfunction and the Problem 
of Overbroad, Functional Software Patents, 90 WASH U. L. REV. 1399, 1430–33 (2013).  
 143. However, overbreadth’s rule of commensurability breaks down when claims encompass 
certain types of after-arising technology. See Collins, supra note 114, at 1093–124. 
 144. O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853).  
 145. Cf. Tun-Jen Chiang, The Levels of Abstraction Problem in Patent Law, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 
1097 (2011). 
 146. O’Reilly, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 85–86. 
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configurations, that employed “the motive power of … electro-magnetism, 
however developed for marking or printing intelligible characters … at any 
distances.”147 The Court upheld Morse’s specific claims because the 
claimed set of technologies was proportional in size to the disclosed set, but 
it invalidated the general claim for overbreadth. The general claim 
encompassed too many undisclosed embodiments. It encompassed too 
many “mode[s] of writing or printing at a distance” that did not “us[e] any 
part of the process or combination set forth in [Morse]’s specification.”148 
Morse was not entitled to the general claim because he invented a small set 
of embodiments and he was unable to disclose a set of embodiments 
commensurate in size with the set encompassed by the general claim. 
Highly general claims have large social costs. Generality increases the 
static and dynamic costs of patent protection.149 It increases static costs 
because it allows the patent owner to increase price and reduce use,150 and 
it increases dynamic costs because it slows down the subsequent progress 
that improves on or experiments with a patented invention.151 Highly 
general patents are more difficult to design around, so they are more likely 
to give the owners of earlier-issued patents control over later-developed 
innovations.152 
2. Technology-Specific Regulatory Inefficacy 
When patents claim diagnostic inferences, overbreadth cannot do the 
work of reducing patent generality that we expect it to do. For simple 
illustrations of overbreadth’s inefficacy, consider two hypotheticals in 
which the inventors of diagnostic inferences can obtain extremely general 
 
 
 147. Id. at 112. 
 148. Id. at 113. It is unclear whether O’Reilly is most analogous to an enablement case, a written 
description case, or even a patent-eligibility case. What is clear, however, is that the Supreme Court 
invalidated the claim because of overbreadth. 
 149. Claim generality usually also increases the gross benefits of patent protection because it 
augments incentives to innovate, but, as generality increases, the costs of additional increments of 
generality eventually outweigh the benefits. Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 
COLUM. L. REV. 257 (2007). 
 150. SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATIONS AND INCENTIVES 103–07 (2004); Joseph E. Stiglitz, 
Economic Foundations of Intellectual Property Rights, 57 DUKE L.J. 1693, 1699–700 (2008). 
 151. F. M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 450–53 
(2d ed. 1980); Stiglitz, supra note 150, at 1710–12.  
 152. Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 
COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990). The correlation between patent generality and the difficulty of design-
around is not perfect. For example, narrow, specific claims to bottleneck technologies can generate 
significant dynamic costs because there are no economic substitutes for the few technologies 
encompassed by the specific claim. John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 440 
(2004) (discussing bottleneck technologies). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss4/8
  
 
 
 
 
2017] PATENT-INELIGIBILITY AS COUNTERACTION 993 
 
 
 
 
claims without triggering any overbreadth concerns. The key observations 
to note here are that an inventor can invent and disclose a single embodiment 
of a diagnostic inference that is intrinsically general and that the disclosure 
of a single, intrinsically general embodiment can enable and demonstrate 
possession of a highly general claim. 
First, consider a hypothetical patent on a diagnostic inference for 
identifying cancer. Early in the scientific process of understanding cancer, 
a researcher discovers the highly general, factual correlation between the 
presence of unregulated cell growth in a tumor and a cell being cancerous.153 
This researcher has discovered a previously unknown, statistically valid 
correlation, and he has invented a novel diagnostic inference that employs 
this correlation as its second premise:  
Premise 1:  An individual patient has a cell that is 
undergoing unregulated growth. 
Premise 2:  In general, patients who have cells 
undergoing unregulated growth are likely 
to have cancer.  
Conclusion:  Said individual patient is likely to have 
cancer.154  
This diagnostic inference is akin to a “tool” claim considered above155 in 
that it is high up on the ladder of generality of the possible diagnostic 
inferences that can be used to identify cancer.156 Yet, disclosure of the 
empirically true fact that functions as Premise 2 in the inference satisfies the 
enablement and written description requirements with respect to this claim, 
 
 
 153. Cancer is a tumor that “is capable of progressive growth, unrestrained by the capsule of the 
parent organ.” BLACK’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 111 (41st ed. 2005).  
 154. No historical inventor sought to patent this inference, but this historical contingency does not 
undermine the immediacy of the concerns raised. Assuming that someone at some time discovered this 
law of nature, only the then-prevalent norms of claim drafting prevented the claim from becoming a 
reality. See supra note 126. Either patent prosecutors had not yet thought up the template of the 
diagnostic-inference patent, or they presumed that it was invalid. For an example of a litigated, highly 
general diagnostic-inference claim that was partially upheld, see Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. 
Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 155. See supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
 156. There are many more specific diagnostic inferences that can also be employed to diagnose 
particular types of cancer. Although Premise 2 remains empirically valid, scientists question whether it 
is more obfuscating than helpful to think of cancer as a single disease. See Gina Kolata, Cancers Share 
Gene Patterns, Studies Affirm, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/02/ 
health/dna-research-points-to-new-insight-into-cancers.html. However, the assumption in the 
hypothetical is that the more specific correlations are not yet known, so the diagnostic being patented is 
the general correlation between cancer and unregulated cell growth. 
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and this claim is therefore not invalid for overbreadth so long as the patent 
discloses that fact. The researcher discovered a single, highly general fact, 
created a single “piece” of highly general knowledge, and claimed a 
diagnostic inference using that “piece” of knowledge as a premise.157 The 
researcher has invented and disclosed a diagnostic method that is 
intrinsically general because it employs newly created, general knowledge 
as a premise.  
Second, consider a hypothetical based on the historical researchers who 
discovered the virus now called HIV.158 These researchers discovered a 
statistically valid correlation between the presence of HIV in a patient’s 
blood and the patient’s likely future development of AIDS. They could have 
claimed the following diagnostic inference:  
Premise 1:  An individual patient has the HIV virus in 
his blood. 
Premise 2:  In general, patients who have the HIV 
virus in their blood are unusually likely to 
develop AIDS in the future.  
Conclusion:  Said individual patient is unusually likely 
to develop AIDS in the future.  
This, too, is a highly general diagnostic-inference claim. Had it been 
sought, AIDS testing and even AIDS research could have been centralized 
under the purview of a single patent owner.159 Yet, so long as the newly 
discovered correlation is statistically valid, the diagnostic-inference patent 
is not invalid for overbreadth. Again, the researcher’s disclosure of the 
single, highly general fact demonstrates both enablement and possession of 
the highly general diagnostic-inference claim.  
Overbreadth is ineffective in these hypotheticals because the generality 
of a diagnostic-inference claim is not a set-theoretical construct. The 
generality of a mental representation in a thinker’s mind derives from the 
generality of the state of affairs in the extra-mental world that it represents. 
 
 
 157. See supra notes 100–104 and accompanying text. 
 158. STEVE CONNOR & SHARON KINGMAN, THE SEARCH FOR THE VIRUS: THE SCIENTIFIC 
DISCOVERY OF AIDS AND THE QUEST FOR A CURE 24–63 (1988). 
 159. The historical antibody patents that were actually issued in the 1980s based on the discovery 
of the HIV virus were not broad enough to centralize AIDS testing or research under the purview of a 
single entity. CONNOR & KINGMAN, supra note 158, at 24–63. Again, only the norms of patent 
prosecutors in the early 1980s prevented the researchers from seeking a diagnostic-inference patent. See 
supra note 154. 
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For example, knowledge that a fever correlates with illness is more general 
than the knowledge that a high fever correlates with the flu because “fever” 
describes a larger set of conditions than “high fever” does and “illness” 
describes a larger set of conditions than “flu” does. The generality of the 
state of affairs to which a mental representation refers is a set-theoretical 
construct. However, a bit of generalized knowledge in a thinker’s mind that 
represents that state of affairs is not. A bit of generalized knowledge is not 
simply a set of bits of specific embodiments of knowledge. Rather, a mental 
representation is an intrinsically general mental state:160 it can be its own, 
distinct mental representation that has a more broadly applicable state of 
affairs as its content.161 In turn, diagnostic inferences can have intrinsic 
generality, too, because their generality derives from the generality of the 
mental representations that they manipulate.  
When patents claim extra-mental technologies, the set-theoretical nature 
of generality means that generality is a quality of a description, not an 
individual embodiment of the technology. However, generality is not 
merely a quality of a description of a diagnostic inference. It is also a 
property of the individual instance or token of the claimed diagnostic 
inference itself.162 
 
 
 160. Describing the generality of a representation as an “intrinsic” property of the representation is 
awkward. The very nature of a representation is something that points to or means something other than 
the thing itself. See DANIEL CHANDLER, SEMIOTICS: THE BASICS 13 (2007) (“[A] sign … stand[s] for 
something other than itself.”). Nonetheless, this Article adopts the “intrinsic” label to highlight the way 
in which the generality of a mental representation, unlike the generality of an extra-mental thing or 
process, is not a set-theoretical construct. 
 161. To reiterate, the generality of the state of affairs in the world that is the content of the 
representation remains a set-theoretical construct. The correlation between fever and sickness is more 
general than high fever and the flu because the terms “sickness” and “fever” refer to larger sets of 
conditions than the terms “high fever” and “flu” do. However, the generality of knowledge in a thinker’s 
mind—i.e., of a thinker’s knowledge-bearing mental state—is not a set-theoretical construct; a bit of 
general knowledge is not merely a collection of a larger set of bits of more specific knowledge.  
Mental representations can have intrinsic generality not because they are mental but rather because they 
are representations. They have intrinsic generality in the same way that the descriptive language of a 
patent claim, another type of representation, can have intrinsic generality. See supra note 139. Cf. KIM, 
supra note 100, at 25 (noting that the representational capacity of extra-mental representations derives 
from the original representational capacity of mental states).  
 162. Another way of framing the important difference between extra-mental technology and 
diagnostic inferences builds on the distinction between categories and concepts. Categories are set-
theoretical constructs: they are classes of distinct things, properties, or processes. E. BRUCE GOLDSTEIN, 
COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 240 (3d ed. 2008); Douglas L. Medin & Lance J. Rips, Concepts and 
Categories: Memory, Meaning, and Metaphysics, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF THINKING & 
REASONING 37, 37 (Keith J. Holyoak & Robert G. Morrison eds., 2005); GREGORY L. MURPHY, THE 
BIG BOOK OF CONCEPTS 5–6 (2002). For example, the category “hand tool” is the set of things in the 
world that are tools that one can hold in one’s hands. In contrast, concepts are entities within our minds 
that stand for, mean, refer to, or represent extra-mental categories. GOLDSTEIN, supra, at 240; Medin & 
Rips, supra, at 37; MURPHY, supra, at 5–6. The concept hand tool is what a thinker uses to identify and 
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The fact that the generality of a diagnostic inference is not a set-
theoretical construct can be proven by demonstrating that there can be 
generality without specificity in an embodiment of a mental representation. 
When generality is a set-theoretical construct, this is impossible.163 
However, in contrast, it is entirely possible for a researcher to possess a 
mental representation of fever correlating with illness without, at the same 
time, possessing a mental representation of a high fever correlating with flu 
(or any other more specific type of fever correlating with any more specific 
type of illness). Similarly, the cancer and HIV researchers have created 
diagnostics that cannot be described in any more specific way than the 
highly general way in which they are claimed. Thus, unlike an embodiment 
of an extra-mental technology, an embodiment of a mental representation 
can have generality without specificity, and a highly general picture claim 
to a diagnostic method is not a logical contradiction. The impossible extra-
mental analog would be a claim that reads on only a single tool yet that 
embodies the full generality of the “hand tool” description. Such a claim is 
impossible because, when generality is a set-theoretical construct, there is 
no such thing as a hand tool that is not also a saw, hammer, screwdriver, or 
any other specific type of hand tool.  
The fact that the generality of a diagnostic-inference claim is an intrinsic 
property of an individual embodiment, not a set-theoretical construct that 
inheres only to collections and descriptions, gums up the mechanism that 
overbreadth employs to regulate claim generality. The intrinsic generality 
of a diagnostic inference means that moving up or down a ladder of 
generality does not aggregate larger or smaller sets of inferences within a 
single description. To the contrary, movement in either direction means 
shifting to different inferences that employ different mental representations 
as premises. The inferences on the higher rungs are intrinsically more 
general than the inferences on the lower rungs. When inventors can invent 
and disclose a single embodiment of a technology that is intrinsically 
 
 
reason about tangible things that are members of the category “hand tool.” Concepts are not set-
theoretical constructs. They may stand for or represent categories, but they themselves are not categories. 
They are singular mental entities in human minds that represent the collections of entities that constitute 
categories. When patents claim extra-mental technologies, they use concepts as a means to the end of 
referring to categories of technology. JOHN LYONS, LINGUISTIC SEMANTICS: AN INTRODUCTION 75–79 
(1995) (explaining that descriptive texts have meaning that is separate from the things or processes to 
which they refer only because they invoke concepts in readers’ minds). They do not refer to concepts 
themselves. However, when patents claim diagnostic inferences, they do refer to, and thus privatize, the 
manipulation of concepts in thinkers’ minds. The mental representations manipulated in a diagnostic 
inference are made up of constellations of concepts placed in logical relationships with one another. See 
Pitt, supra note 103, at § 3. 
 163. See supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
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general, a general claim will frequently be commensurate, rather than 
overbroad, with respect to the disclosure. (Imagine how easy it would be to 
obtain broad claims if an inventor could disclose a single embodiment of a 
technology that enables and demonstrates possession of the full breadth of 
a general hand-tool claim.) Greater generality does not mean a larger set of 
distinct technologies within claim scope, so greater generality cannot 
threaten to make the claimed set of technologies too large in respect to the 
disclosed set of technologies. The generality of the claimed inference can 
move in lock step with the intrinsic generality of the disclosed correlation 
that functions as Premise 2, so researchers who discover highly general facts 
about the world can routinely enable and possess intrinsically general 
diagnostic inferences. They do not encounter overbreadth problems.164  
In sum, overbreadth is an ineffective regulator of permissible claim 
generality when patents claim diagnostic inferences or other technologies 
that manipulate meaningful mental states. The lack of effective generality 
regulation will raise the social cost of patent protection for diagnostics 
inferences. When patents claim extra-mental technology, and generality is 
a set-theoretical construct, overbreadth ensures that the costly, general 
claims are given out only infrequently. Only the rare inventors who make 
significant contributions to progress and disclose many distinct 
embodiments of a technology can satisfy the written description and 
enablement doctrines when they seek general claims. To receive a hand-tool 
claim, an inventor must likely disclose hammers, screwdrivers, and pliers, 
among other technologies. However, when patents claim diagnostic 
inferences, overbreadth’s inefficacy means that highly general claims can 
routinely be given to inventors who do not make unusually significant 
contributions to technological progress. In fact, more costly, general claims 
are easier to obtain than less costly, specific claims are. An early pioneer in 
the medical sciences usually generates knowledge of a general correlation 
before generating any knowledge of more specific correlations. For 
example, researchers are likely to understand the easy-to-discover, general 
correlation between fever and illness before they understand the difficult-
to-discover, specific correlation between high fever and flu. Absent 
counteraction, the general diagnostic-inference claims that impose the 
greatest costs on society will often be the easiest diagnostic inferences for 
patent applicants to acquire.165  
 
 
 164. Greater generality in a diagnostic inference can lead to validity problems other than 
overbreadth. For example, a disclosed correlation can become so general that it is no longer empirically 
true, and a diagnostic inference based on a false correlation lacks utility. 
 165. Patents on general diagnostic inferences only lead to generality costs if performing a specific 
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D. Reconceptualizing Mayo  
In Mayo, the Supreme Court held the claimed diagnostic method to be a 
patent-ineligible law of nature.166 Employing its two-stage methodology for 
assessing patent-eligibility,167 the Court initially identified the newly 
discovered correlations between metabolite levels and medically ill-advised 
risks as laws of nature and then concluded that the claim did not describe a 
patent-eligible application of those laws.168 More specifically, the Court 
used the inventive-concept approach in the second stage,169 reasoning that 
the claim was patent-ineligible because its advance over the prior art resided 
solely in the correlations themselves. Inversely stated, the claim limitations 
other than the wherein clause—namely the administering and determining 
steps—“consist[ed] of well-understood, routine, conventional activity 
already engaged in by the scientific community.”170 Had either of these 
steps, or even their combination, embodied an inventive contribution, the 
claim may have been patent-eligible.171 
Patent commentary has roundly criticized Mayo and its inventive-
concept approach with two arguments, both of which are based on 
discrimination theory. First, focusing on diagnostic inferences in particular, 
commentators assert that there is no good reason to believe that diagnostic 
inferences deserve weaker patent protection than other technologies 
deserve.172 Second, expanding their analysis beyond diagnostic inferences, 
 
 
diagnostic inference infringes a claim to a general diagnostic inference. However, given that the mental 
representations at different rungs of the ladder of generality are distinct mental states, this legal outcome 
is not preordained. If performing a specific diagnostic inference does not infringe a claim to a general 
diagnostic inference, and there is no strict liability for nonvolitional conduct, see supra notes 135–138 
and accompanying text, then general diagnostic-inference patents will not create high generality costs. 
Rather, they will create an archipelago problem as infringement can be easily avoided, regardless of the 
generality of the patented inferences. See supra notes 136–138 and accompanying text. 
 166. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012). For an 
overview of the invention and claims at issue, see supra notes 91–93 and accompanying text. 
 167. See supra notes 59–62 and accompanying text. 
 168. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1296–98. 
 169. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
 170. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1298. See also id. at 1303–04. 
 171. Id. at 1302. 
 172. Eisenberg, Wisdom, supra note 6, at 27–31; Jeffrey L. Fox, Industry Reels as Prometheus Falls 
and Myriad Faces Further Reviews, 30 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 373, 373 (2012); Christopher M. 
Holman, Mayo, Myriad, and the Future of Innovation in Molecular Diagnostics and Personalized 
Medicine, 15 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 639, 666–77 (2014) [hereinafter Future of Innovation]; Christopher M. 
Holman, Patent Eligibility as a Policy Lever to Regulate the Patenting of Personalized Medicine, in 
PERSPECTIVES ON PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER 114 (Michael B. Abramowicz, James E. Daily, & F. 
Scott Kieff eds., 2014) [hereinafter Policy Lever]; Rai, supra note 6, at 113. But see SACGHS REPORT, 
supra note 131 (reviewing evidence that patent incentives were not needed to develop a number of 
simple genetic diagnostic inferences). 
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commentators convincingly argue that the Court’s inventive-concept 
approach to patent-eligibility would invalidate an unexpectedly large swath 
of patents if its nature-oriented reasoning were taken at face value.173 Many 
claims that we unquestioningly treat as patent-eligible subject matter—and 
that should remain patent-eligible subject matter, provided the patent regime 
exists at all—would be invalid if newly discovered laws of nature could not 
be the claims’ inventive concept.174 In light of these criticisms, proposals 
for cabining Mayo usually suggest that Mayo should not be taken at face 
value. More specifically, they suggest that Mayo should be cabined by either 
redefining laws of nature in a narrow fashion or abandoning the inventive-
concept approach altogether.175  
Counteraction theory, however, offers a different way of cabining Mayo: 
Mayo should be interpreted in a mind-centered, not nature-centered, 
manner. Under the conventional nature-centered interpretation, the 
purported naturalness of the correlations in patients’ bodies is the crux of 
the patentability problem.176 In contrast, under a mind-centered 
interpretation, what is natural and what is man-made artifice is irrelevant. 
Rather, it is the mental status of the diagnostic inference that employs the 
correlation as a premise that is the crux of the patentability problem. 
Diagnostic-inference patents are likely to have a pro-patentee bias because 
the patentability conditions cannot effectively regulate technologies that 
manipulate meaningful mental states.177 So, Mayo should be 
reconceptualized to require an inventive concept in the claim separate from 
limitations describing any such mental technologies.178 
 
 
 173. Chao, supra note 6, at 427–33; Rai, supra note 6, at 112; Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Inventive 
Application: A History, 67 FLA. L. REV. 565, 623–31 (2015); Michael Risch, Nothing Is Patentable, 67 
FLA. L. REV. F. 45, 47–53 (2015); Ted Sichelman, Funk Forward, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AT THE 
EDGE: THE CONTESTED CONTOURS OF IP 361, 375–77 (Rochelle Dreyfuss & Jane Ginsburg eds., 2014).  
 174. New uses of known chemicals, the mercury thermometer, and even Velcro would arguably be 
patent-ineligible. Collins, supra note 105, at 1335–36.  
 175. Eisenberg, Prometheus Rebound, supra note 6, at 342–44; Holman, Future of Innovation, 
supra note 172, at 667–69; Sichelman, supra note 173, at 377–80. The Federal Circuit has also expressed 
concern about taking the inventive-concept approach in Mayo at face value. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. 
Sequenom, Inc., 809 F.3d 1282, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Lourie, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing 
en banc) (stating that Mayo means that the Federal Circuit is “unfortunately obliged” to employ an 
inventive-concept approach in the second stage of the patent-ineligibility analysis). 
 176. The laws of nature branch of patent-ineligibility prevent patent applicants from gaining 
ownership over nature. Nature is viewed as something that “has always existed” and that the applicants 
did not invent. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 n.15 (1978); see also Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo 
Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 129 (1948). 
 177. See supra Sections II.B, II.C. 
 178. The Supreme Court has repeatedly and explicitly identified mental processes as patent-
ineligible subject matter, including in Mayo. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 
S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). The Federal Circuit sometimes 
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A mind-centered interpretation of Mayo does cut against the grain of the 
opinion’s “laws of nature” rhetoric.179 However, this is the price to be paid 
for a consequential justification of Mayo under counteraction theory. 
Counteraction theory provides a sound justification for a mind-centered 
interpretation of Mayo that defuses the Mayo critics’ two principal 
arguments.180 It undermines the first argument by identifying a good reason 
to restrict the patent-eligibility of diagnostic-inference patents even if 
diagnostic inferences do not deserve weak patent protection: a restriction on 
patent-eligibility can counteract the regulatory inefficacy of inherency and 
overbreadth. It undermines the second argument because the curb on patent-
eligibility created by a mind-centered interpretation of Mayo is far narrower 
in its impact than the curb created by a nature-centered interpretation. Most 
patented inventions are wound up with laws of nature in some way and are 
vulnerable to invalidation under a nature-centered interpretation of Mayo.181 
In contrast, very few patent claims recite the manipulation of meaningful 
mental states as claim limitations, and fewer yet rely entirely on such 
limitations to establish distinction from the prior art.182 In fact, a mind-
centered interpretation would come close to limiting Mayo’s patent-
invalidating impact to a subset of diagnostic technologies.183 Although 
most, if not all, patentable inventions are accompanied by the discovery of 
 
 
makes mental processes patent-ineligible by labeling them as abstract ideas. CyberSource Corp. v. Retail 
Decisions, Inc. 654 F.3d 1366, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2011). However, the Court did not frame its Mayo 
analysis in terms of either the mental-process or abstract-ideas exclusion. But cf. infra note 179 (noting 
that there is often slippage between the different categories of excluded subject matter).  
 179. Nonetheless, a mind-centered interpretation of Mayo is a reasonable interpretation. Collins, 
supra note 105, at 1315–21 (arguing that both the reasoning in the Mayo opinion and the structure of the 
Patent Act support a mind-centered interpretation). The Supreme Court’s earlier cases establishing the 
patent-ineligibility of algorithms had significant slippage between the abstract ideas and laws of nature 
exclusions. Compare Benson, 409 U.S. at 71–72 (ideas), with Flook, 437 U.S. at 590–91 (laws of nature). 
Some slippage between laws of nature and mental processes should therefore not be shocking. 
Furthermore, a mind-centered interpretation maps cleanly onto the reasoning and outcomes in most post-
Mayo cases. Many of the Federal Circuit’s post-Mayo cases involving diagnostic patents discuss the 
mental nature of inference steps and reach holdings that are consistent with a mind-centered 
interpretation of Mayo. In re BRCA1- and BRCA2-Based Hereditary Cancer Test Patent Litigation, 744 
F.3d 755 (Fed. Cir. 2014); SmartGene, Inc. v. Advanced Biological Labs., 555 Fed. App’x. 950 (Fed. 
Cir. 2014); PerkinElmer, Inc. v. Intema Ltd., 496 Fed. App’x. 65 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Ass’n for Molecular 
Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 1333–35 (Fed. Cir. 2012). See also 
Eisenberg, supra note 72, at 271–76 (discussing the mental-steps trend in post-Mayo cases). But see 
Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Ass’n for Molecular 
Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1335–37.  
 180. See supra notes 172–173 and accompanying text. 
 181. See supra note 173. 
 182. See supra note 105. 
 183. Importantly, however, a mind-centered interpretation would not invalidate all diagnostic 
technologies. See infra note 185.  
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new knowledge,184 diagnostic inferences are the only type of invention for 
which inventors routinely seek patent protection where logical reasoning 
enabled by the mental representations that embody that knowledge is held 
out as the privatized technology itself. Additionally, not all newly invented 
medical diagnostics depend on the novelty of a diagnostic inference to 
establish an inventive contribution to the prior art, so many diagnostic 
patents remain patent eligible under a mind-centered interpretation of 
Mayo.185 
The inventive-concept approach to the second stage of the patent-
eligibility analysis has perhaps been the most criticized aspect of the 
Supreme Court’s Mayo opinion.186 However, under a mind-centered 
interpretation, the inventive-concept approach is a feature, not a flaw, of the 
analysis. It minimizes the reach of the restriction on patent-eligibility, 
tailoring the restriction to the problem created by the regulatory inefficacy 
of inherency and overbreadth. The inventive-concept approach means that 
claims are invalid only if the advance over the prior art resides entirely in 
the content of mental representations employed in the diagnostic inference, 
and it is only under this condition that inherency and overbreadth 
malfunction. Inherency is ineffective when claims rely on the content of a 
mental representation to establish a distinction from the prior art.187 
However, if the extra-mental steps embody an advance over the prior art, 
then the claim describes a novel set of extra-mental technologies, and 
inherency is perfectly capable of regulating patent density.188 Similarly, the 
inefficacy of overbreadth is normatively problematic only when the 
particular limitation that is responsible for the overbreadth lies at the claim’s 
point of novelty.189 Inventors should be able to draft their claims broadly 
 
 
 184. Cf. WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, 2 THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 496 (1890) 
(discussing the mental component of an invention). 
 185. For an example of a medical-diagnostic patent that is patent-ineligible under a nature-centered 
interpretation of Mayo but patent-eligible under a mind-centered interpretation, see Ariosa Diagnostics, 
Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 186. See supra note 173 and accompanying text. See also Mark A. Lemley, Point of Novelty, 105 
NW. U. L. REV. 1253, 1277–79 (2011) (discussing the impact of the point of novelty approach of Parker 
v. Flook). But see Chao, supra note 6, at 433–41 (seeking to rehabilitate the point of novelty approach 
to patent-eligibility after Mayo).  
 187. See supra Section II.B.2.  
 188. Many diagnostic-inference claims that rely on trivial advances in the extra-mental steps to 
establish novelty will likely be invalid for obviousness. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012). The obviousness 
doctrine does not suffer from regulatory inefficacy when patents claim diagnostic inferences. Newly 
discovered knowledge, whether recited as a mental-representation claim limitation or not, routinely 
supports nonobviousness under the guise of an invention’s “unexpected consequences.” United States 
v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 51–52 (1966). 
 189. Kevin Emerson Collins, Getting into the “Spirit” of Innovative Things: Looking to 
Complementary and Substitute Properties to Shape Patent Protection for Improvements, 26 BERKELEY 
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away from the point of novelty; the generality of a diagnostic-inference 
limitation should not be relevant in the overbreadth analysis if that 
limitation is not required to identify an invention that embodies a patentable 
advance over the prior art.190 In sum, although the inventive-concept 
approach is conventionally viewed as the most problematic aspect of the 
Supreme Court’s Mayo opinion, it is precisely this approach that tailors a 
mind-centered interpretation of Mayo to the subset of problematic claims 
that trigger regulatory inefficacy and that are likely to lead to excessive 
density and generality costs.  
There are, of course, caveats on the ability of counteraction theory to 
justify a mind-centered interpretation of Mayo, even when regulatory 
inefficacy in the patentability conditions has been documented.191 For 
example, the default principle that all technologies merit roughly the same 
quantum of patent protection may not apply. In fact, one could reasonably 
argue that optimal patent policy might grant diagnostic inferences unusually 
strong patent protection. Diagnostic inferences have significant social value 
because they give rise to personalized or precision medicine.192 They are 
also becoming more expensive to produce, as the FDA is increasing the 
scope of its regulatory footprint in medical diagnostics.193 Together, these 
features of the innovation profile in the medical-diagnostics industry 
suggest that, under the conventional argument about technology-specificity 
in patent law,194 the pro-patentee bias created by regulatory inefficacy 
should not be counteracted because it is a welfare-enhancing bias. 
 
 
TECH. L.J. 1217 (2011); Mark A. Lemley, Software Patents and the Return of Functional Claiming, 
2013 WIS. L. REV. 905, 958–59 (2013). 
 190. Consider a claim that recites two limitations, one describing an extra-mental product or process 
and the other describing a diagnostic inference. If the extra-mental limitation constitutes a novel and 
nonobvious invention, then only the generality of the extra-mental limitations can lead to an overbreadth 
problem. The diagnostic-inference limitation is simply a restriction on the scope of an otherwise valid 
claim. It does no harm to the public, regardless of its overbreadth. If a claim reciting limitations A, B, 
and C is patentable, then a highly general limitation D in a claim reciting limitations A, B, C, and D does 
not over-reward an inventor, even if D’s breadth is not fully supported by the specification. Note, 
however, that limitation D may inappropriately prevent future inventors from obtaining an improvement 
patent if limitation D is highly specific and added after the original application is filed. In re Ruschig, 
379 F.2d 990, 995–96 (C.C.P.A. 1967). 
 191. See supra notes 75–79 and accompanying text. 
 192. Holman, Policy Lever, supra note 172, at 115–23. For a general discussion of personalized 
medicine, see Margaret A. Hamburg & Francis S. Collins, The Path to Personalized Medicine, NEW 
ENGLAND J. MED., July 22, 2010, at 301; PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. AND TECH., 
PRIORITIES FOR PERSONALIZED MEDICINE (2008), http://www.whitehouse.gov/files/documents/ostp/ 
PCAST/pcast_report_v2.pdf. 
 193. See generally Rachel E. Sachs, Innovation Law and Policy: Preserving the Future of 
Personalized Medicine, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1881 (2016). 
 194. See infra notes 281–282 and accompanying text. 
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Alternatively, even if the goal of inter-technology equality in patent 
protection is adopted, the counteraction provided by a mind-centered 
interpretation of Mayo may be poorly calibrated to the regulatory inefficacy 
that is present. The restriction on patent-eligibility may overshoot: it may 
create an anti-patentee bias that is stronger than the pro-patentee bias 
created by the inefficacy of inherency and overbreadth.195 These two 
arguments can also be combined. Any overshooting may be unusually 
harmful because of the strong social need for innovation incentives, even if 
the overshooting yields an anti-patentee bias that is not greater in magnitude 
than the pro-patentee bias of regulatory inefficacy. 
Another caveat is that there may be another possible restriction on the 
patent-eligibility of diagnostic inferences that is more closely tailored to the 
regulatory inefficacy of the patentability conditions than a mind-centered 
interpretation of Mayo. Regulation resistance creates fertile conditions for 
high density and generality costs, but it does not guarantee that every 
diagnostic-inference patent will actually yield such costs. Some diagnostic-
inference patents will not contribute to excessive density.196 Other 
diagnostic-inference patents will not impose large generality costs.197 
However, it is doubtful that there is a better-tailored, and yet still 
administrable, rule for selectively invalidating only the costly diagnostic-
inference patents. The information that examiners and judges need to 
identify the patents that will actually create significant density and 
generality costs is impossible to obtain.198  
To see the difficulty of a more targeted exclusion, consider 
commentators’ proposals that the Supreme Court’s recent patent-eligibility 
cases should be interpreted narrowly so that only the patents that are likely 
to foreclose significant amounts of future innovation (roughly, basic-tool 
patents) are held invalid.199 In theory, such a foreclosure-of-innovation 
 
 
 195. Whether over-counteraction is acceptable depends in part on whether there is an administrable 
rule that provides more closely calibrated counteraction. See infra notes 196–211 and accompanying 
text. 
 196. For example, all relevant knowledge about a system may be discovered simultaneously. See 
supra text accompanying note 125.  
 197. For example, the claims may be premised on highly contingent and specific correlations. See 
supra note 161 and accompanying text. 
 198. The argument here is a variant of the classic debate that pits over- and under-inclusive rules 
against better-tailored standards. See generally FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A 
PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1991). Rules 
are preferable when the decision maker cannot easily obtain the information needed to administer the 
standard accurately.  
 199. Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & James P. Evans, From Bilski Back to Benson: Preemption, Inventing 
Around, and the Case of Genetic Diagnostics, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1349, 1370–75 (2011); Lemley et al., 
supra note 6, at 1324–27; Sichelman, supra note 173, at 377–80; Allen K. Yu, Within Subject Matter 
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proposal offers a restriction on patent-eligibility that is more closely tailored 
to patents that will actually create large generality costs than a mind-
centered interpretation of Mayo. (But note that it does not address the 
regulatory inefficacy of inherency and the corresponding density costs.) In 
practice, however, a foreclosure-of-innovation proposal fails to produce 
workable doctrine for drawing a line between patent-eligible and patent-
ineligible diagnostic inferences.200  
The proposal by Mark Lemley, Michael Risch, Ted Sichelman, and R. 
Polk Wagner for bringing patent-ineligibility to bear on diagnostic-
inference patents illustrates this difficulty.201 Lemley et al. identify a list of 
foreclosure-of-innovation factors—including both overbreadth and a 
number of sui generis factors, namely whether “the claimed invention [is] 
potentially generative of many kinds of new inventions,” whether the 
technological field “rel[ies] heavily on cumulative invention,” and whether 
the field is “fast-moving”202—and they conclude that the Mayo patent is 
patent-ineligible under these factors.203 Lemley et al. rely on overbreadth to 
do the bulk of the heavy lifting in identifying foreclosure of future 
innovation.204 They find none in Mayo, stating that Mayo “involves an 
application of the natural principles discovered by the patentee.”205 This 
result is not surprising, given that overbreadth is an ineffective regulator of 
diagnostic inferences. Diagnostic inferences are never overbroad with 
respect to the disclosure of a statistically valid correlation, so overbreadth 
will never arise in this context.206  
With overbreadth eliminated as a factor that could weigh against patent 
eligibility, the fate of the foreclosure-of-innovation proposal hangs on the 
 
 
Eligibility—A Disease and a Cure, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 387, 428–30 (2011). 
 200. In other words, a mind-centered interpretation of Mayo is more of a rule-like, categorical 
exclusion than the foreclosure-of-innovation proposals are: the cost of its over-exclusion is 
counterbalanced by the benefit of its administrability. See supra notes 69–72 and accompanying text 
(discussing the gatekeeper defenses of patent-ineligibility). 
 201. Lemley et al., supra note 6, at 1342–44. The proposal is designed for all types of patents, but, 
among other examples, they consider the Mayo patent.  
 202. Id. at 1341. Lemley et al. also state that courts should consider whether a patentee’s 
contribution is “important … relative to the prior art.” Id. This is not a measure of the foreclosure of 
future innovation but rather a measure of whether an inventor deserves a patent that forecloses future 
innovation. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1303 (2012) 
(reasoning that the Mayo claims are patent ineligible in part because the patentees only made a small 
contribution to progress). 
 203. Lemley et al., supra note 6, at 1344. 
 204. They even refer to their proposal as an “overclaiming” proposal. Lemley et al., supra note 6, 
at 1317; see also Sichelman, supra note 173, at 374 (arguing that patent-eligibility invalidates claims 
“when the scope of the claim is much greater than the practical application actually invented”). 
 205. Lemley et al., supra note 6, at 1344. 
 206. See supra Section II.C.2. 
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remaining sui generis factors. Lemley et al. simply ignore the two economic 
factors that look to the nature of an industry or technological field as a proxy 
for dynamic costs.207 The choice to overlook these factors is understandable 
given that the factors are extremely rough proxies for dynamic costs, but it 
reinforces how unhelpful the factors are in selectively screening out only 
the costly patents. The principal argument that Lemley et al. advance to 
support their conclusion is that the Mayo claim “is not generative” and that 
it will not “unduly bar future inventors.”208 To the extent that these 
assertions are factually correct, they make a strong case in favor of patent 
ineligibility. However, Lemley et al. provide no real evidence to back up 
this assertion.209 The failure to provide evidence to demonstrate a lack of 
innovation foreclosure is not surprising. Measuring innovation foreclosure 
directly requires that an examiner or judge look past the technology that 
exists today and identify the viable routes to the technologies of tomorrow 
that will be non-infringing substitutes if they are ever developed.210 Other 
commentators who articulate foreclosure-of-innovation proposals for 
tailoring restrictions on patent-ineligibility openly acknowledge the 
 
 
 207. These factors would likely have weighed in favor of patent-ineligibility because the biomedical 
sciences are widely considered to be fast moving and cumulative. Arti K. Rai, Fostering Cumulative 
Innovation in the Biopharmaceutical Industry: The Role of Patents and Antitrust, 16 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 813, 814 (2001).  
 208. Lemley et al., supra note 6, at 1344. 
 209. The only argument offered to support their assertion degenerates into a game of shift-the-
baseline on a ladder of generality or an insoluble levels-of-abstraction problem. Lemley et al. argue that 
the Mayo patent is not a basic-tool patent because there are broader, more basic claims that could have 
been made. That is, the patentee could have “claimed all correlations of every drug in the body,” and, in 
relation to this broad claim, the Mayo patent only correlates “very specific measurements of a particular 
drug” to changes in the likelihood of particular clinical outcomes. Id. This hypothetical is unhelpful for 
two reasons. First, the broad, hypothetical claim is invalid for lack of utility because it is based on a 
premise that is so general that it is not factually true. See supra note 164. Second, the up-the-ladder move 
can be readily countered with a down-the-ladder move. Consider a diagnostic-inference patent premised 
on a newly discovered correlation between a metabolite level being ten percent over the optimal upper 
threshold and a twenty percent increase in the likelihood of adverse side effects. The Mayo patent is 
extremely general in comparison to this hypothetical patent, and it would foreclose significantly more 
future innovation. 
 210. Determining the future commercial viability of a nascent technology has proven extremely 
difficult in the rare patent-misuse cases in which the analysis cannot be avoided. Princo Corp. v. Int’l 
Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Even the overtly economic methodology of antitrust 
law shies away from the identification of innovation markets because the foreclosure of future 
innovation is so difficult to measure. Richard J. Gilbert & Steven C. Sunshine, Incorporating Dynamic 
Efficiency Concerns in Merger Analysis: The Use of Innovation Markets, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 569, 596 
(1995) (“In many market circumstances there is so much serendipity in research and development that 
it is impossible to predict the sources of innovation with reasonable certainty.”); Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Response: Markets in IP and Antitrust, 100 GEO. L.J. 2133, 2135 (2012) (“[M]arket power assessment 
will probably never do a good job of taking innovation into account because innovation is so badly 
behaved ….”). 
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difficulty of identifying undue foreclosure of future innovation.211 Nor do 
the Supreme Court’s repeated discussions of the basic-tools justification for 
patent-ineligibility provide guidance on how to selectively screen out basic-
tool claims.212 In sum, the factors in a foreclosure-of-innovation test are 
either measurable generalities that are not highly probative of a patent’s 
effect on future innovation or highly probative economic conclusions that 
are next to impossible to measure. 
The caveats on Mayo’s fit with counteraction theory discussed above are 
significant and should not be lightly dismissed. What is clear, however, is 
that technology-specific regulatory inefficacy makes protection for 
diagnostic inferences an “innovation-inefficient means of increasing the 
incentive to innovate” relative to patent protection on other technologies.213 
The innovation-inefficiency of patent protection for diagnostic inferences, 
in turn, suggests that an institution other than patent law might be the best 
means for providing additional innovation incentives in this field, if such 
incentives are needed.214 For example, a mind-centered interpretation of 
Mayo that limits the patent protection available for medical diagnostics 
could be coupled with regulatory exclusivity administered by the FDA as 
part of the FDA’s ongoing shift in its regulatory footprint in medical 
diagnostics.215 An FDA-administered exclusivity regime could provide 
innovation incentives without employing peripheral claims and thus without 
laboring under the regulatory inefficacy that inheres in diagnostic inference 
patents. Even if the costs of regulatory inefficacy are smaller than the costs 
of a mind-centered interpretation of Mayo, the costs of providing incentives  
  
 
 
 211. For example, Rochelle Dreyfuss and James Evans acknowledge that their proposed 
foreclosure-of-innovation analysis “require[s] both a grasp of the field and an understanding of the 
patented invention’s epistemic significance within it” and that “[t]hese are not easy tasks.” Dreyfuss & 
Evans, supra note 199, at 1372. In fact, they implicitly concede that these determinations may be beyond 
the institutional competence of courts when they propose that the PTO should convene a panel of experts 
to address the matter. Id.  
 212. Strandburg, Preemption, supra note 6, at 568. In fact, the Supreme Court has expressly noted 
the absence of any such proxies. In Mayo, the Court invoked a lack of institutional competence to support 
its rejection of a foreclosure-of-innovation rule that draws a line between diagnostic inferences based on 
the generality of the correlation at issue. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. 
Ct. 1289, 1303 (2012) (“[J]udges are not institutionally well suited to making the kinds of judgments 
needed to distinguish among different laws of nature.”). 
 213. C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory 
Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1612–14 (2006) (arguing against pay-for-delay settlements). 
 214. See Hemel & Ouellette, supra note 68, at 326–61 (developing a framework for choosing 
between patents, prizes, grants, and tax credits for providing innovation incentives). 
 215. Rai, supra note 6, at 113; Sachs, supra note 193, at 1889–99. For a discussion of FDA 
regulatory exclusivity in general, see Yaniv Heled, Regulatory Competitive Shelters, 76 OHIO ST. L. J. 
299 (2015). 
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through another institution might well be yet lower than the costs of 
regulatory inefficacy. 
III. PROOF OF CONCEPT: SOFTWARE AND ALICE 
In Alice v. CLS Bank,216 the Supreme Court held that a patent claim to a 
computer-executed method of reducing risk in a financial transaction 
describes a patent-ineligible “abstract idea.”217 Counteraction theory 
provides a reasonable, although concededly imperfect, explanation for the 
Court’s reasoning in Alice. Section III.A demonstrates that a software 
invention is a purely functional technology in the sense that it can only be 
defined, and thus claimed, by its functional properties. Section III.B 
identifies the regulatory inefficacy that is specific to software (and other 
purely functional technologies). It explains that two of patent law’s 
patentability conditions—means-plus-function claiming and written 
description—cannot do the work of invalidating costly patents that they 
usually do when confronted with claims to purely functional technologies 
like software.218 Section III.C examines the fit between the restriction on the 
patent-eligibility of software that can be justified by counteraction theory 
and the rule of patent-ineligibility announced in Alice.  
A. Software Is a Purely Functional Technology 
All embodiments of technologies that can infringe a patent claim have 
two types of properties: structural and functional.219 Structural properties 
include physical, spatial, and chemical properties. For example, having a 
compressed spring is a structural property of a mousetrap, and having a 
particular molecular structure is a structural property of a therapeutic drug. 
In contrast, functional properties are the tasks an invention can achieve, the 
behavioral capacities that it possesses, and the roles it can play in a larger 
system. For example, being capable of releasing stored potential energy 
upon being jostled is a functional property of a spring-loaded mousetrap, 
and being capable of curing a particular disease is a functional property of 
a drug. No token of a technological product or process is either purely 
 
 
 216. 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
 217. Id.  
 218. The Federal Circuit’s cases identifying algorithms as the metaphorical structure of software 
inventions give means-plus-function claiming some regulatory grip, but they do not fix the regulatory 
inefficacy at issue. See infra notes 251–255 and accompanying text.  
 219. In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 210, 212 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (distinguishing structural properties that 
describe what an invention “is” from functional properties that describe what an invention “does”). 
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functional or purely structural; all such tokens possess both structural and 
functional properties.220 Furthermore, structural and functional properties 
are interrelated: the predominant materialist worldview holds that a 
technology possesses the functional properties that it does only because it 
possesses its structural properties.221 That is, there is a one-way dependence 
of causality from structure to function: the structural properties of a 
technology are what give rise to its functional properties.222 What makes a 
mousetrap capable of catching mice or a drug capable of curing a disease? 
The answer resides in the structural properties of the mousetrap or drug.  
In one way, the relationship between the structural and functional 
properties of software is no different from the relationship that exists in a 
mousetrap or drug. Programmed computers do not undermine 
materialism:223 just like mousetraps and drugs, they are material, worldly 
entities that have physical, structural properties that allow them to perform 
the functions that they perform.224  
Yet, in another way, software is exceptional. Unlike in a mousetrap or 
drug, the physical, structural properties of a software program are usually 
irrelevant to identifying, delineating, or defining what a programmer does 
when she invents a software program. Programmers certainly don’t develop 
software by planning out the software’s physical properties: “a programmer 
who modifies the physical structure of a computer by providing source code 
to the computer need not even know that the computer’s memory is being 
physically modified at all, much less understand or appreciate the nature of 
those physical modifications.”225 Nor, after the program is created, does a 
structural description of the program turn into a reasonable way of 
identifying what the program is: “[t]he process of computer programming 
enables a programmer to create a machine that has a particular novel 
physical structure for performing a particular function without requiring the 
programmer to design the novel features of the machine in physical 
 
 
 220. Peter Kroes, Technological Explanations: The Relation Between Structure and Function of 
Technological Objects, 3 PHIL. & TECH. 18, 18 (1998) (discussing “two different modes of description, 
viz., a structural and a functional mode of description” for technological objects).  
 221. See generally MATERIALISM AND THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM (David M. Rosenthal ed., 2d ed. 
2000) (collecting significant historical and contemporary essays on materialism). 
 222. For this reason, the structural properties of a technology are commonly viewed as an answer 
to the “how” question of technology: “how [a] system will be able to perform the required function” 
requires “an explanation . . . in terms of the physical structure of that [system].” Kroes, supra note 220, 
at 20–21. 
 223. Software is commonly and incorrectly labeled as exceptional because it is “non-physical.” See, 
e.g., In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1989).  
 224. Robert Plotkin, Computer Programming and the Automation of Invention: A Case for Software 
Patent Reform, 7 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1, 38–39 (2003).  
 225. Id. at 44–45. 
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terms.”226 The exceptional, functional nature of software—i.e., the 
irrelevance of the physical, structural properties of a software embodiment 
to the definition of a software program—is not an accident. To the contrary, 
it has been engineered into the very nature of software itself at the most 
fundamental of levels. The core value of software lies in the fact that the 
task of programming need not involve any consideration of the physical 
properties of the hardware.227 It is practically impossible to refer to a set of 
structural characteristics shared by the embodiments of a software 
invention. In contrast, it is entirely possible for a mechanical engineer who 
invents a mousetrap and a chemist who invents a small-molecule drug to 
conceive of their inventions in structural terms. 
Software is thus exceptional not because it is literally immaterial, but 
rather because it is aspatial. A real-world embodiment of a software 
invention has physical, material properties, but these properties are not 
relevant to what constitutes a protectable software invention. A protectable 
software invention is a purely functional technology on all relevant levels 
of definition: it is function “all the way down.”228  
B. Structure, Function, and Patent Generality 
The written description doctrine and the rules of means-plus-function 
claiming are usually effective regulators of patent validity insofar as they 
curb permissible patent generality and remove costly, general claims from 
the patent regime. However, when patents claim purely functional 
technologies like software, these patentability conditions cannot do the 
work that we expect them to do. Their efficacy as regulators of patent 
validity is contingent upon a technology having physical structure that is 
relevant to the definition of what an inventor has invented, and software has 
no such physical structure.  
 
 
 226. Id. at 26.  
 227. See W. DANIEL HILLIS, THE PATTERN ON THE STONE, at ix (1998) (“Computers are 
understandable because you can focus on what is happening at one level of the hierarchy without 
worrying about the details of what goes on at the lower levels.”). See also Plotkin, supra note 224, at 
36; Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 
COLUM. L. REV. 2308, 2317 (1994). 
 228. STEPHEN HAWKING, A BRIEF HISTORY OF TIME 1 (updated and expanded 10th anniversary ed. 
1998) (using an origin myth about a stack of turtles to raise the issue of infinite regress to find a ground).  
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1. Means-Plus-Function Claiming and Written Description Usually 
Curb Generality 
Means-plus-function claiming and written description are patentability 
conditions that invalidate claims defined only by a functional description of 
a technology.229 Inversely stated, both mandate that an inventor include 
some of the physical, structural properties of the technology that he invented 
as limitations on claim scope.  
The rules of means-plus-function claiming were Congress’s response to 
Supreme Court cases in the first half of the twentieth century that regularly 
invalidated patent claims relying solely on limitations reciting the functional 
properties of a newly invented technology to establish a claim’s novelty 
over the prior art.230 For example, in Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. 
Walker, an inventor claimed an improved machine for measuring the depth 
of an oil well.231 The advance lay in the device’s ability to measure sound 
waves reflected not only from the well’s bottom but from its tubing joints 
as well.232 In some of the inventor’s claims, this advance was described in 
purely functional language as a means for tuning a resonator to sound waves 
reflected from tubing joints.233 The Court invalidated these claims because 
they employed purely functional language to describe the advance over the 
prior art or, inversely stated, failed to specify any structural properties of the 
newly invented technology that differentiated the claimed invention from 
the prior art.234 The Court reasoned that such claims should be invalid 
because the purely functional claim language would create excessive 
generality costs: 
In this age of technological development there may be many other 
devices beyond our present information or indeed our imagination 
which will perform that function and yet fit these claims. And unless 
frightened from the course of experimentation by broad functional 
claims like these, inventive genius may evolve many more devices to 
accomplish the same purpose.235  
 
 
 229. See supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text. 
 230. See, e.g., Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1 (1946); Gen. Elec. Co. v. 
Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364 (1938); Holland Furniture Co. v. Perkins Glue Co., 277 U.S. 
245 (1928).  
 231. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing, 329 U.S. at 5–7. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. at 8–9. 
 234. Id.  
 235. Id. at 12. 
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In the 1952 Patent Act, Congress overruled Halliburton Oil Well Cementing 
when it articulated the rules of means-plus-function that still exist today.236 
These rules are a compromise of sorts. They overturn the Court’s holding 
in that they allow inventors to draft claims with purely functional 
limitations. However, if inventors use purely functional limitations, a 
special, scope-restricting rule of claim construction will limit the scope of 
their claims: the functional limitations can only read on devices for 
performing the recited function that have the physical, structural properties 
of the technologies disclosed in the specification or their equivalents.237 In 
short, claim scope is limited to technologies that have the physical, 
structural properties of the inventor’s disclosed embodiments. 
The written description requirement is a more recently minted doctrine 
that extends the rules of means-plus-function claiming to the biomedical 
sciences, albeit with an invalidity rule rather than a scope-narrowing rule of 
claim construction.238 Written description mandates that the set of claimed 
technologies must remain commensurate with the set of technologies that 
the inventor “invented” or “possessed” at the time of filing.239 The 
technologies that the inventor “invented” or “possessed,” in turn, is 
legalistic code for the technologies that have some core subset of the 
structural properties of the technologies that an inventor discloses in the 
specification.240 Written description is thus a tool for invalidating claims 
that employ excessively functional limitations and capping the permissible 
claim generality of patent claims.241 
For example, in University of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co.,242 the 
 
 
 236. 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (2012). 
 237. Id.  
 238. The written description doctrine is often assumed to impose an unusual, technology-specific 
burden on biotechnology inventors. This view of written description is misguided because it fails to 
account for the technology-specific benefit that biotechnology inventors receive from not being subject 
to the rules of means-plus function claiming. The rules of means-plus-function claiming were never 
imported into biotechnology, so the written description doctrine was invented to fill the gap and provide 
roughly the same scope-regulating role in the biotechnological arts that the rules of means-plus-function 
claiming play in other arts. In sum, written description does not tilt a level playing field but instead levels 
an already tilted one. Collins, supra note 142, at 1431 n.128.  
 239. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
 240. Collins, supra note 142, at 1430–33. 
 241. The primary function of written description is commonly identified as a prohibition on claims 
that are filed too early in time, before an inventor understands the structure of any of the embodiments 
that he is claiming. See, e.g., BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 12, at 118. However, the not-too-early 
concern is just a limit condition of the not-too-broad concern. If an inventor has not disclosed the 
structure of any embodiment within the scope of the claims, the set of claimed technologies is never 
commensurate with the set of technologies that the inventor invented or possessed at the time of filing 
because the set invented or possessed is a null set. 
 242. 358 F.3d 916 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
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Federal Circuit invalidated a claim to a method of administering a non-
steroidal compound that selectively inhibits the activity of a particular 
protein.243 The claim recited only a functional property of the compound, 
and the patent did not disclose—let alone recite as a limitation on claim 
scope—the structural properties of any molecule capable of achieving the 
desired function.244 Similarly, in Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & 
Co., the court invalidated claims to methods of reducing the binding of a 
transcription factor to a family of genes.245 The claims were purely 
functional—they “encompass[ed] the use of all substances that achieve the 
desired result”—and they therefore were not limited by the structural 
properties of any molecule that could achieve that result.246 Reinforcing that 
written description requires structural limitations on claim scope, the 
Federal Circuit noted that written description problems are “especially acute 
with genus claims that use functional language to define the boundaries of 
a claimed genus. In such a case, the functional claim may simply claim a 
desired result, and may do so without describing [the structures of the] 
species that achieve that result.”247 
Claims that are drafted with purely functional language, and that are 
therefore invalid under means-plus-function claiming or written 
description, are likely to generate significant generality costs. Not only do 
purely functional claims reach beyond that which an inventor has invented, 
they reach toward the definition markets and thereby make design-around 
unusually difficult.248 The requirement that valid claims include some 
physical-structure limitations serves as an administrable proxy for 
eliminating claims with excessive generality costs in most technologies. 
2. Technology-Specific Regulatory Inefficacy 
When patents claim purely functional technologies such as software, 
neither means-plus-function claiming nor written description is an effective 
regulator. Those patentability conditions can limit generality costs when the 
physical, structural properties of a technology are relevant to the definition 
of what an inventor has invented, but software is an unusual technology in 
which the physical, structural properties of an invention are not relevant in 
 
 
 243. Id. at 917. 
 244. Id. at 927. 
 245. Ariad Pharm, 598 F.3d at 1340. 
 246. Id. at 1341, 1350. 
 247. Id. at 1349. 
 248. Collins, supra note 142, at 1411–24. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss4/8
  
 
 
 
 
2017] PATENT-INELIGIBILITY AS COUNTERACTION 1013 
 
 
 
 
this way.249 Means-plus-function claiming and written description thus 
malfunction in the software arts. They cannot get the grip needed to rein in 
the overbreadth of functional claims because there are no relevant physical, 
structural properties to grab onto and require as claim limitations.250 Absent 
a sui generis restriction of some kind, technology-specific regulatory 
inefficacy means that functional software claims—that is, all software 
claims—should be expected, on average, to be unusually broad and generate 
unusually high generality costs. 
The regulatory inefficacy of the patentability conditions in diagnostic 
inferences has, to date, gone unrecognized, but it has not gone unrecognized 
in the software arts. The Federal Circuit has already taken the first step 
needed to modify means-plus-function claiming in a sui generis, 
technology-specific manner and transform it into an effective regulator: it 
identified an “algorithm” as a metaphorical structure in the software arts.251 
Functional limitations in means-plus-function software claims are thus 
limited in scope to the algorithms for performing the claimed function 
disclosed in the specification and their equivalents.252 While the Federal 
Circuit’s algorithm-as-structure patch to means-plus-function claiming in 
the software arts moves the law in the right direction, it does not go nearly 
far enough to eliminate the technology-specific regulatory inefficacy of 
means-plus-function claiming and written description. The algorithm-as-
structure rule has proven to be formalistic, inconsistently applied, and easily 
 
 
 249. See supra Section III.A. 
 250. Nor can enablement—patent law’s other main patentability condition that curtails permissible 
claim scope—step in and do the needed work. Enablement is poorly equipped to curtail the reach of 
claim scope into after-arising technology that has not yet been conceived or visualized at the time of 
filing. Collins, supra note 142, at 1433–39; Collins, supra note 114, at 1098–105.  
Antibody technology, too, was a purely functional technology as a practical matter in its early days. 
Unlike software, antibodies have not been purposely engineered to make structure irrelevant. Rather, it 
was our limited ability to characterize the two or three-dimensional structure of antibodies and 
understand how they bound to antigens that made them purely functional as a practical matter. Because 
antibodies were purely functional technologies, the written description doctrine suffered from regulatory 
inefficacy when brought to bear on antibodies, too, just as it does when it is brought to bear on software. 
Noelle v. Lederman, 355 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (discussing the PTO’s “antibody exception” to 
written description). 
 251. WMS Gaming Inc. v. Int’l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1347–50 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The Federal 
Circuit has also suggested that algorithms are the metaphorical structure of software inventions under 
the written description doctrine. LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, 424 F.3d 1336, 1340–43 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005); Robert P. Merges, Software and Patent Scope: A Report from the Middle Innings, 85 TEX. 
L. REV. 1627, 1665 (2007). 
 252. If there is no disclosed algorithm, the claim is invalid. Aristocrat Techs. Australia Pty Ltd. v. 
Int’l Game Tech., 521 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008). In computer science, an algorithm specifies a way of 
achieving a functionally defined task with a series of more specifically defined functions. DICTIONARY 
OF COMPUTER SCIENCE, ENGINEERING, AND TECHNOLOGY 13 (Phillip A. Laplante ed., 2000) (“step-by-
step procedure … for solving certain kinds of problems or accomplishing a task”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1014 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 94:955 
 
 
 
 
evaded.253 For example, method claims are never construed using the rules 
of means-plus-function claiming,254 and the algorithm-as-structure patch 
does not establish the level of specificity at which a functional description 
of a software program qualifies as an algorithm.255 
C. Reconceptualizing Alice  
In Alice, the Supreme Court addressed a claim to a software invention 
for reducing settlement risk through the use of a trusted third-party 
intermediary.256 The claim described a series of computer-implemented 
steps: 
(a) creating a shadow credit record and a shadow debit record for each 
stakeholder party …; 
(b) obtaining … a start-of-day balance for each shadow credit record 
and shadow debit record; 
(c) … adjusting each respective party’s shadow credit record or 
shadow debit record [for every transaction resulting in an exchange 
obligation and] allowing only these transactions that do not result in 
the value of the shadow debit record being less than the value of the 
shadow credit record at any time …257 
Employing its two-stage methodology for evaluating patent-eligibility,258 
the Court concluded that this claim described a patent-ineligible abstract 
idea rather than a patent-eligible application of that idea. First, the Court 
identified “the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third 
party to mitigate settlement risk” as an abstract idea.259 Second, the Court 
 
 
 253. Collins, supra note 142, at 1461–63; Lemley, supra note 189, at 944–46. The Federal Circuit’s 
recent opinion in Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc), did 
recently make the rules of means-plus-function claiming more difficult to evade. For proposals that pre-
date Williamson to apply the algorithm-as-structure patch to means-plus-function claiming in a more 
systematic manner, see infra note 273.  
 254. Collins, supra note 142, at 1461–62.  
 255. Id. at 1463–65; Kevin Emerson Collins, The Williamson Revolution in Software’s Structure, 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2016).  
 256. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
 257. Id. at 2352 n.2. 
 258. See supra notes 59–62 and accompanying text. 
 259. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355–57. Alice offers little guidance on the criteria that courts should use 
to identify and define an abstract idea. It reasons that intermediated settlement is an abstract idea because 
it is similar to risk hedging, an activity that the Court had already labeled as an abstract idea in Bilski. 
Id. However, Bilski did not explain why the concept of hedging risk is an abstract idea, either. Bilski v. 
Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611–12 (2010). 
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held that the limitations that described how the method was to be performed 
on a computer—for example, “creating a shadow credit record” and 
“adjusting” those credit records—were too generic to transform the claim 
into a patent-eligible application of an abstract idea.260 More specifically, 
the Court again used the inventive-concept approach to reach this 
conclusion,261 reasoning that the claim limitations specifying the software 
implementation of the abstract idea on a computer were not an advance over 
the prior art but were rather “purely conventional.”262 Counterfactually, had 
the claim described an advance in computer science—that is, an advance 
showing how to “improve the functioning of the computer itself” with more 
efficient software—the Court implied that the claim could have been 
directed to a patent-eligible, inventive application of an abstract idea.263  
The debate over a consequentialist justification for Alice has, to date, 
followed the template provided by discrimination theory: commentators 
have disagreed over whether there is a good reason for the patent regime to 
grant weaker protection to innovative, computer-implemented abstract 
ideas than it grants to run-of-the-mill innovative technologies. This debate 
commonly plays out under the assumption that most patent-ineligible 
abstract ideas in the software context are methods of conducting business.264 
Alice critics draw on scholarship suggesting that patent incentives for the 
development of innovative business methods are just as valuable as 
incentives for the development of other innovative technologies.265 Alice 
supporters argue that the social benefits of business-method patents are low 
because there are adequate innovation incentives for business methods even 
absent patent protection and that their social costs are high because business 
methods are akin to the basic tools of our economy.266  
 
 
 260. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2359–60.  
 261. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
 262. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357–58, 2359–60. 
 263. Id. at 2359. Alice also suggested that software claims could be patent-eligible if there are 
advances “in any other technology or technical field” besides computer science. Id. at 2359–60.  
 264. Post-Alice opinions have also made this association. DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 
773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“Although the Supreme Court did not “delimit the precise 
contours of the ‘abstract ideas’ category” in resolving Alice . . . [w]e know that some fundamental 
economic and conventional business practices are . . . abstract ideas.”). Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 
63 (1972), identified mathematical algorithms as abstract ideas, but few post-Alice cases have followed 
Benson’s lead and addressed the patent-ineligibility of mathematical algorithms. 
 265. Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property for Market Experimentation, 83 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 337 (2008) (arguing that free riding undermines incentives to implement truly innovative 
business models).  
 266. Dreyfuss, supra note 67, at 275–76; Olsen, supra note 6, at 228–34; Samuelson & Schultz, 
supra note 6, at 121–25. The four concurring Justices in Bilski v. Kappos also endorsed the policy 
argument that software innovation does not benefit from patent protection. 561 U.S. 593, 648–56 (2010). 
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In contrast, counteraction theory changes the nature of the questions that 
we must ask to find a consequentialist justification for Alice. Does Alice’s 
restriction on patent-eligibility counteract the regulatory inefficacy of the 
means-plus-function and written description doctrines? Does it bring 
otherwise excessively strong patent protection for software back into better 
alignment with the norm of protection in all technologies? The answer, of 
course, depends on in part on what constitutes an abstract idea. For example, 
Alice’s justification under counteraction theory is stronger if a patent-
ineligible claim to an abstract idea is a code phrase for a claim to a software 
program drafted at too high a level of generality, regardless of whether the 
software executes a business method. Inversely stated, Alice makes more 
sense if functional limitations specifying how to “improve the functioning 
of the computer itself”267 amount to a functional description that is 
sufficiently specific that it does not generate undue generality costs. If an 
abstract idea were to be defined with reference to claim generality, then a 
restriction on the patent-eligibility of abstract ideas would not cause the 
patent regime as a whole to discriminate against software patents. Rather, it 
would call on patent-ineligibility to do roughly the same work in the 
software arts that the patentability conditions are already doing in other arts 
but cannot do in software because of technology-specific regulatory 
inefficacy.268  
However, even if counteraction theory does justify a restriction on the 
patent-eligibility of software claims, the doctrinal fit between the precise 
restriction on patent-eligibility announced in Alice and the restriction 
needed to counteract regulatory inefficacy in the software arts may prove to 
be a bit awkward. There are two interconnected, open doctrinal questions 
that could undermine this fit. First, should the locus of the claim’s inventive 
concept matter? Alice says it should,269 and it thereby yields a relatively 
narrow set of patent-ineligible claims. So long as there is sufficient 
specificity in the limitations that embody the inventive concept, then the 
claim is patent-eligible, regardless of the level of generality of other 
 
 
 267. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2359.  
 268. The usual caveats on counteraction as a justification for a restriction on patent-eligibility also 
apply. See supra notes 75–78 and accompanying text. To be clear, defining an abstract idea solely with 
reference to claim generality raises significant administrability problems. Most notably, a direct 
assessment of the magnitude of a claim’s generality costs may be beyond the competence of examiners 
and Article III judges. Collins, supra note 142, at 1466–67. In fact, the difficulty of directly assessing a 
claim’s generality costs is one reason why patent law adopted the distinction between functional and 
structural claim limitations as a proxy for those costs in the first place. Id. at 1411–24. 
 269. See supra notes 260–263 and accompanying text. 
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functional limitations.270 Yet, neither means-plus-function claiming nor the 
written description doctrine overtly requires any consideration of a claim’s 
inventive concept.271 Thus, it would seem that a restriction on patent-
eligibility that simply counteracts the inefficacy of these doctrines in the 
software arts should not employ the inventive-concept approach.272 Second, 
does there need to be metaphorical structure in each individual claim 
limitation? Alice requires sufficient specificity only in the limitations 
embodying a claim’s inventive concept, so it does not seem to mandate 
sufficient specificity in each of the “creating,” “obtaining,” and “adjusting” 
limitations. Whether Alice’s approach provides the counteraction with the 
best fit to the regulatory inefficacy at issue, however, is unclear because the 
two doctrines whose inefficacy Alice seeks to counteract take different 
approaches on this issue. Means-plus-function claiming requires every 
functional limitation, considered individually, to recite some physical 
structure, whereas the written description doctrine has not been applied on 
a limitation-by-limitation basis. A full analysis of how these two questions 
should be answered, and thus a more definitive assessment of the fit 
between Alice and the restriction needed to counteract the regulatory 
inefficacy in the software arts, requires a more detailed analysis than can be 
undertaken here.273 What can be said, however, is that, under counteraction 
theory, Alice pushes the status quo of patent law in the right direction as it 
 
 
 270. The inventive-concept approach leads to a relatively broad exclusion on another dimension. 
For example, imagine that each of the “creating,” “obtaining,” and “adjusting” steps in the Alice claim 
is limited to one of several conventional programming techniques for achieving the claimed method. 
Under an inventive-concept approach, the claim would remain patent-ineligible because the locus of the 
advance over the prior art still exists only at the level of an abstract idea. However, if one were only 
worried about generality costs, this claim would not be problematic because there are conventional, non-
infringing techniques for implementing the abstract idea. 
 271. See supra notes 236–241 and accompanying text. But cf. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. 
v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1, 8 (1946) (holding only that functional claiming at a claim’s “point of novelty” 
was problematic) (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 371 (1938)). 
 272. But cf. supra notes 189–190 and accompanying text (suggesting that broad claiming away from 
the point of novelty is not problematic). 
 273. If one believes that the optimal counteraction ignores the inventive concept and demands 
specificity on a limitation-by-limitation basis, then the best approach to counteraction might not 
implicate the doctrine of patent-eligibility at all. Rather, the needed counteraction could come from a sui 
generis, technology-specific modification of the rules of means-plus-function claiming. Rather than 
simply calling whatever functional description exists in the specification an algorithm, courts could 
identify a level of specificity at which a functional description of a software program should be treated 
as a metaphorical structure. For example, functional limitations that map onto end-user preferences 
(tasks that consumers want the software to perform) could be invalid for overbreadth while functional 
limitations that describe programming techniques for satisfying those end-user preferences could be 
valid because they are limited to the metaphorical structure of a software invention. Collins, supra note 
142, at 1421–23, 1466. See also Lemley, supra note 189, at 943–63 (suggesting limitations describing 
the “goal” or “function of the program” should be invalid as overbroad, whereas limitations describing 
“the way an inventor implements a function” should not). 
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offsets the regulatory inefficacy of certain patentability conditions in the 
software arts, even if it turns out to do so imperfectly. 
IV. NEW DIRECTIONS 
The value of counteraction theory lies, in part, in its explanatory power. 
Counteraction theory provides a reasonable, although concededly 
imperfect, consequentialist justification for the Supreme Court’s recent 
opinions on the patent-ineligibility of diagnostic inferences in Mayo and 
software in Alice.274 However, the explanatory power of counteraction 
theory should not be overstated. Counteraction theory cannot conveniently 
justify all of the Supreme Court’s recent cases on patent-eligibility. To the 
contrary, it sheds little light on restrictions on patent-eligibility that, like the 
Court’s recent opinion in Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad 
Genetics, are tasked with ensuring that the realm of the natural remains 
beyond the reach of patent law.275  
Beyond its explanatory import, counteraction theory pushes back against 
conventional wisdom and moves patent scholarship in new directions on a 
number of dimensions. This part briefly notes four of them. 
A. Patent-Ineligibility Versus the Patentability Conditions 
Prior scholarship recognizes that patent-ineligibility and the 
patentability conditions are imperfect substitutes in the sense that both are 
capable of regulating what constitutes a permissible patent interest and 
doing the welfare-enhancing work of invalidating costly patents. However, 
to date, commentators have only used this insight to advocate against 
restrictions on patent-eligibility. One of the most frequently echoed 
arguments in debates over patent-eligibility is what should be called the 
Annie Oakley argument: anything patent-ineligibility can do to regulate 
patent validity, the patentability conditions can do better.276 Counteraction 
 
 
 274. See supra Sections II.D, III.C. 
 275. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (holding that 
genomic DNA, but not complementary DNA, is patent-ineligible). Nor can counteraction theory justify 
a nature-centered interpretation of Mayo. See supra notes 176–178 and accompanying text. 
 276. Donald Chisum’s assertion is typical of the Annie Oakley argument: “Used with appropriate 
vigor, the [patentability conditions] can effectively screen out virtually all claims . . . that are . . . only 
abstract ideas or natural phenomena ….” Donald S. Chisum, Weeds and Seeds in the Supreme Court’s 
Business Method Patents Decision: New Directions for Regulating Patent Scope, 15 LEWIS & CLARK 
L. REV. 11, 14 (2011). Michael Risch’s assertion is typical, too: “any invention that satisfies the 
[patentability conditions] is patentable.” Michael Risch, Everything Is Patentable, 75 TENN. L. REV. 
591, 591 (2008). For other uses of the Annie Oakley argument, see Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. 
Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1073–74 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Duffy, supra note 6, at 622–23; Kristin Osenga, 
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theory turns the Annie Oakley argument on its head. The need for 
restrictions on patent-eligibility follows directly from the patentability 
conditions inability to do the needed work under certain circumstances. That 
is, it is the technology-specific regulatory inefficacy of the patentability 
conditions that gives rise to a need for restrictions on patent-eligibility.  
B. A Grand Unified Doctrine of Patent-Ineligibility? 
By stating in Alice that its two-stage methodology should guide the 
patent-ineligibility analysis for laws of nature, natural phenomenon, and 
abstract ideas, the Supreme Court articulated what amounts to a grand 
unified doctrine of patent-eligibility—a single doctrine that identifies the 
boundary of patent-eligible subject matter in all technologies.277 
Counteraction theory counsels against any such grand unified theory.278 
Counteraction theory and discrimination theory may justify restrictions on 
patent-eligibility in different contexts, and there is no a priori reason to 
expect the two different reasons for curtailing patent-eligibility to be 
optimally implemented through the same doctrine. Furthermore, even 
looking only at restrictions justified by counteraction theory, there is no 
reason to employ the same doctrine in different technological arts. Different 
patentability conditions become ineffective in different technologies for 
different reasons, and different patent-ineligibility rules are best for 
counteracting these divergent variants of regulatory inefficacy. For 
example, the inventive-concept approach to patent-eligibility is necessary 
to counteract regulatory inefficacy in diagnostic inferences,279 but it may not 
be in software.280  
 
 
Ants, Elephant Guns, and Statutory Subject Matter, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1087, 1115–18 (2007). Cf. Dennis 
Crouch & Robert P. Merges, Operating Efficiently Post-Bilski by Ordering Patent Doctrine Decision-
Making, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1673, 1674 (2010) (arguing that the patentability doctrines can do 
most of the needed work and that patent-eligibility decisions should be avoided by applying the 
patentability conditions first as a procedural matter). For commentary critiquing, or at least finding 
exceptions to, the Annie Oakley theory, see Eisenberg, Wisdom, supra note 6, at 50–64; Lemley et al., 
supra note 6, at 1329–32; Golden, supra note 6, at 1055–74; Olson, supra note 6, at 202.  
 277. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014). See also PTO Eligibility 
Guidelines, supra note 59, at 74,621–25 (interpreting Myriad to employ the same inventive-concept 
methodology articulated in Alice and Mayo). A grand unified theory of patent-ineligibility is also a 
common goal in patent scholarship. See, e.g., Emily Michiko Morris, What Is “Technology”?, 20 B.U. 
J. SCI. & TECH. L. 24 (2014); Efthimios Parasidis, A Uniform Framework for Patent Eligibility, 85 TUL. 
L. REV. 323 (2010). 
 278. Cf. Kevin Emerson Collins, Bilski and the Ambiguity of “An Unpatentable Abstract Idea”, 15 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 37, 61–65 (2011) (arguing that patent-eligibility should have different doctrinal 
manifestations to address different types of costly claims). 
 279. See supra notes 187–190 and accompanying text. 
 280. See supra notes 269–272 and accompanying text. 
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C. Technology-Specific Patent Law 
A rich vein of contemporary patent scholarship argues in favor of 
technological-specificity in patent law.281 The dominant narrative is that 
patent law is facially neutral but that it is—and should be—applied in a 
technology-specific manner because the economic profile of innovation 
differs from industry to industry.282 Stronger protection may be appropriate 
when innovation is costly, and weaker protection may be appropriate when 
innovation is cheap or non-patent incentives for innovation are present. 
Inversely, narrow protection may be appropriate when an industry develops 
through cumulative innovation, except perhaps when large incentives for 
pioneer innovations are beneficial because pioneer innovations are both 
expensive to produce and socially valuable. In all of these situations, the 
core argument in favor of technology-specific patent law is the same: 
different technological fields merit different types of patent protection 
because different industries have different economic profiles of innovation.  
Counteraction theory, too, suggests that patent law is technology-
specific, but the technological specificity arises for a different reason. Under 
counteraction theory, patent law is not technologically neutral by default. 
Differences in the intrinsic natures of technologies hardwire technology-
specific regulatory inefficacy into the patentability conditions.283 
Technology-specific counteraction through patent-ineligibility simply 
responds to the hardwired technological specificity. This response is not 
designed to create different levels of patent protection in different industries 
 
 
 281. Dan Burk and Mark Lemley launched this argument. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 12, at 37–
48.  
 282. Id. A secondary argument is that courts, rather than Congress, should do the needed tailoring. 
Id. at 95–108.  
 283. To date, patent commentary has largely ignored or “black-boxed” the differences in the 
intrinsic natures of patented technologies that cause regulatory inefficacy. Michel Callon & Bruno 
Latour, Unscrewing the Big Leviathan: How Actors Macro-Structure Reality and How Sociologists Help 
Them to Do So, in ADVANCES IN SOCIAL THEORY AND METHODOLOGY: TOWARD AN INTEGRATION OF 
MICRO- AND MACRO-SOCIOLOGIES 277, 284–85 (Karin Knorr-Cetina & Aaron Victor Cicourel eds., 
1981) (“A black box contains that which no longer needs to be reconsidered, those things whose contents 
have become a matter of indifference.”). More generally, economically minded commentary often black-
boxes the intrinsic properties of technology. Clive Lawson, An Ontology of Technology: Artefacts, 
Relations and Functions, 12 TECHNÉ 48, 49 (2008) (arguing that economists routinely reduce technology 
to a production function characterized by inputs and outputs). One notable exception is Jim Bessen and 
Mike Meurer’s argument that software-specific patent law, whether in the form of a restriction on patent-
eligibility or something else, is needed because software is intrinsically “abstract.” JAMES BESSEN & 
MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT 
INNOVATORS AT RISK 201–12 (2008). However, precisely what makes software abstract, and thus what 
makes the patentability conditions unable to regulate patents like they usually do, remains underspecified 
in Bessen and Meurer’s argument. Id. 
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to accommodate the industry-specific economics of innovation. Rather, it is 
designed to offset technology-specific regulatory inefficacy and bring the 
strength of patent protection available in different industries into closer 
alignment. 
D. Rethinking Intangibility as a Limit on Patent-Eligibility 
Historically, intangible inventions could not be patented.284 However, as 
economically valuable technology dematerialized over the last half 
century,285 the bar on patenting intangible inventions gradually eroded. In 
the industrial age, the intangibility bar made sense: it was a reasonable 
proxy for a bar on patenting the knowledge about inventions that patentees 
are obligated to disclose and make available to the public as part of patent 
law’s quid pro quo.286 It ensured that machines, chemicals, and eventually 
processes of using the same were patent-eligible, but that newly discovered 
knowledge about those technologies was not. However, in the shift from the 
industrial era to today’s knowledge of information economy, intangibility 
gradually ceased to be a viable litmus test for patent-ineligibility. A strict 
intangibility bar came to be seen as an irrational, technology-specific 
exclusion of the most cutting-edge of technologies—most notably 
software—from the patent regime.287 Although there may be good reasons 
to exclude some inventions that happen to be intangible from the patent 
regime, the simple fact that an invention is intangible is not generally 
understood to be one of them.288  
Yet, puzzling waves of resistance to the patentability of intangible 
inventions still come and go. In Diamond v. Diehr,289 the Supreme Court 
described “a function which the patents laws were designed to protect” as 
“transforming or reducing an article to a different state or thing.”290 Diehr’s 
focus on tangibility reappeared in the Freeman-Walter-Abele test for patent-
eligibility, which over time slowly faded away.291 More recently, the 
Federal Circuit employed the machine-or-transformation test to assess 
 
 
 284. Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1876) (“A process . . . is an act, or a series of acts, 
performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state or thing.”); Richard 
S. Gruner, Intangible Inventions: Patentable Subject Matter for an Information Age, 35 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 355, 355–56 (2002). 
 285. See supra note 85. 
 286. Collins, supra note 105, at 1315–21. 
 287. In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882 (C.C.P.A. 1970); Gruner, supra note 284, at 359–61. 
 288. Gruner, supra note 284, at 356–67.  
 289. 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
 290. Id. at 192.  
 291. In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 907 (C.C.P.A. 1982). 
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patent-eligibility and thereby positioned tangibility as the defining feature 
of patent-eligible subject matter.292 Today, the machine-or-transformation 
test is in retreat, and the importance of intangibility as a limit on patent-
eligibility again seems to be decreasing.293 
To date, none of the periodic ascendancies of intangibility as a 
touchstone for patent-ineligibility has produced a convincing normative 
explanation of why intangibility should play this role for today’s 
knowledge-age technologies. Counteraction theory and regulatory 
inefficacy therefore break new ground by offering an otherwise absent 
explanation of both why and how intangibility should remain wound up 
with the patent-eligibility analysis. Intangibility lies at the root of regulatory 
inefficacy. The dematerialization of industrial-era technologies that led to 
today’s relatively intangible technologies is exactly what caused certain 
patentability conditions to become ineffective regulators.294 Intangible 
subject matters merit a skeptical second look as part of the patent-eligibility 
analysis because they are likely to trigger regulatory inefficacy in the 
patentability conditions. The causal relationship from intangibility to 
regulatory inefficacy also identifies the types of intangibility that should be 
relevant in patent law—namely those that trigger regulatory inefficacy. The 
intangibility of meaningful mental states causes problems,295 as does the 
intangibility of software.296 To date, courts have been looking for 
intangibility in all the wrong places, and responding to it in all the wrong 
 
 
 292. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff’d on other grounds, Bilski v. Kappos, 561 
U.S. 593 (2010). In software, the machine-or-transformation test and its use of tangibility as a touchstone 
of patent-eligibility led some Federal Circuit judges to uphold apparatus claims and invalidate method 
claims to the same invention. CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269, 1305–11 (Fed. Cir. 2013) 
(Rader, J., concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part) (upholding apparatus claims and invalidating 
method claims to the same software invention). Cf. Lemley et al., supra note 6, at 1322–25 (raising 
unanswered questions about the patentability of software inventions under the machine-or-
transformation test). In diagnostic inferences, the Federal Circuit came to see the tangibility of the 
determining step that precedes the inference step as dispositive of patent-eligibility. Compare 
Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010), rev’d, Mayo, 132 
S. Ct. 1289 (2012) (upholding a claim with a determining step that transformed matter into a different 
state or thing), with Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329, 
1355 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated sub nom., Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 
S. Ct. 1794 (2012) (invalidating a claim in which the determining step could be performed simply by 
reading). 
 293. The Supreme Court quickly demoted the machine-or-transformation test from the sole test for 
patent-eligibility to “a useful and important clue” for assessing patent-eligibility. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 
U.S. 593, 604 (2010). The Supreme Court’s silence on the subject of the machine-or-transformation test 
in subsequent cases has led the Federal Circuit to reduce its reliance on it.  
 294. See supra notes 83–86 and accompanying text. 
 295. See supra Part II.  
 296. See supra Part III. 
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ways, because they have not understood why the intangibility of a patented 
technology is normatively problematic.297  
CONCLUSION 
Over the last six years, the Supreme Court has issued an unprecedented 
four opinions restricting the reach of patent-eligibility under Section 101 of 
the Patent Act. These opinions have received a tepid reaction in patent 
commentary, at best. Sound consequentialist justifications for these 
opinions have proven difficult to identify.  
This Article develops counteraction theory as a justification for 
restrictions on patent-eligibility, and it illustrates that counteraction theory 
provides a reasonable, although concededly imperfect, justification for 
some of the Court’s recent patent-eligibility opinions. Counteraction theory 
has its greatest explanatory power in the Supreme Court’s opinions in Mayo 
addressing diagnostic inferences, provided Mayo is interpreted in a mind-
centered manner, and in Alice addressing software. However, it provides 
little insight into the Court’s opinion in Myriad that draws a line between 
unpatentable nature and patentable, man-made artifice. 
 
 
 
 297. See supra section II.C.2. Intangibility still has a role to play in keeping the privatizing effects 
of patent claims out of the realm of the disclosure. See supra note 286 and accompanying text. However, 
this role is neither as important nor as straightforward as it is often assumed to be. Collins, supra note 
105, at 1321–49 (detailing the limits on patentability that are needed to protect patent law’s duality of 
claiming and disclosing).  
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